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Introduction
Most economic exchanges are not based on fully contingent, explicit contracts, but
rather rely on informal agreements that specify the contracting parties’ obligations
only imprecisely. There are several reasons why this is the case. First, the costs
of writing fully contingent contracts can be too high. Moreover, the contracting
parties often cannot or do not foresee all future contingencies at the time when they
enter the trade agreement. Finally, many economic interactions are characterized
by private information or opportunities to take hidden actions. It can thus be
impossible—or at least prohibitively costly—to monitor and verify the fulfillment of
a trading partner’s contractual obligations.
In the labor market, contractual incompleteness is particularly widespread. Em-
ployment contracts in many occupations are rather general agreements that specify
far from all aspects of an employment relation. Contracts often only stipulate a fixed
salary and a required working time but do not, e.g., specify precisely which tasks an
employee has to fulfill. Moreover, pay is rarely tied explicitly to performance. One
explanation for this lies in the fact that work effort and performance are inherently
difficult to verify. In addition, research in contract and game theory has identified
several circumstances where it might not be necessary or even undesirable for an
employer to connect pay more closely to performance although it would, in principle,
be possible.
First, employment relations are typically “repeated interactions” over a long
time horizon. Therefore, there is scope for self-enforcing relational contracts that
are sustained by the value of future interaction (MacLeod and Malcomson 1989,
Baker et al. 1992). Second, and based on a related argument, employees have
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concerns for their future career. If employees are looking for a better paid job in the
future, either within the firm (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Rosen 1986) or in other firms
(Fama 1980, Holmstro¨m 1999, Gibbons and Murphy 1992), they have strong implicit
incentives to perform well, although pay is not tied to current performance. Finally,
an employer might not want to use high-powered pay-for-performance incentives if
he aims at inducing the employee to engage in multiple tasks, but can only verify
performance in a subset of these tasks (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1991).
However, there could also be psychological reasons why employers do not want
or need to use high-powered incentive schemes. In recent years, a growing body of
literature in psychology and behavioral economics has enhanced our understanding
of the psychological foundations of incentives and has demonstrated that employee
behavior does not only depend on the relationship between measured performance
and pay. Rather, pay-for-performance schemes can have unintended, dysfunctional
consequences if workers are concerned about horizontal or vertical equity (Adams
1965), are intrinsically motivated (Deci 1971, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000), or dislike
being controlled (Falk and Kosfeld 2006). Moreover, it has been shown that social
preferences can be able to mitigate moral-hazard problems. Especially reciprocity,
i.e., the willingness to reward kind actions and punish unkind ones even at a cost, has
proven to be highly effective in eliciting work effort under contractual incompleteness
(Fehr et al. 1997, Fehr and Falk 2002).
A deeper understanding of the interaction between monetary incentives and non-
monetary motivations has allowed to advance economic models of labor market
behavior, e.g., by analyzing the consequences of social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt
1999), self-control problems (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999), or reference points such
as relative income concerns or personal income targets (Neumark and Postlewaite
1998, Ko¨szegi and Rabin 2006). This has also shed new light on the effectiveness of
important labor market institutions such as minimum wage laws (Falk et al. 2006)
or employment protection legislation (Falk, Huffman and MacLeod 2008).
This dissertation aims at further enhancing our understanding of behavior under
contractual incompleteness, with a particular focus on employment relationsships.
All chapters analyze situations where explicit pay-for-performance contracts are not
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feasible, and therefore gains from trade can only be realized if trading parties suc-
cessfully make use of implicit monetary or non-monetary incentives. All of the four
chapters report evidence from laboratory experiments. Controlled laboratory and
field experiments have rapidly emerged as a vital component of research in labor
economics. For the questions addressed in this dissertation, the use of experimen-
tal methods allows identifying direct causal effects since treatment conditions (e.g.,
incentive schemes) can be varied exogenously.
Chapters 1–3 concentrate on interactions that are characterized by moral hazard.
It is analyzed whether and how trust and social preferences can help mitigating these
problems. Chapter 1 studies the intrapersonal relationship between trust and reci-
procity and explores to what extent heterogeneity in individuals’ reciprocal inclina-
tion can account for commonly observed differences in trusting behavior. Chapter 2
deals with the question how horizontal fairness concerns impact the effectiveness of
incentive schemes that are based on reciprocal gift exchange. Chapter 3 analyzes
whether two common features of implicit contracts—gift exchange and relational
contracting—can lead to involuntary unemployment. Chapter 4 studies incentives
provided through promotion competitions. More precisely, it addresses the question
how people behave in multi-stage elimination tournaments in comparison to simple,
one-stage promotion contests.
All chapters focus on topics that are vital for understanding labor market insti-
tutions and behavior in employment relations. They are thus directly relevant for
questions studied in personnel and labor economics. However, the chapters analyze
the impact of monetary and non-monetary incentives on behavior, more generally.
The relevance of the results presented below thus reaches beyond labor market ap-
plications. For instance, trust (studied in Chapter 1) is involved in essentially all
economic transactions. Mutual trust between trading parties reduces the cost of
economic exchanges, thus making it easier to realize gains from trade. Ultimately,
a high level of trust might therefore be conducive to economic growth (Knack and
Keefer 1997). Social comparison and equity concerns, which are driving forces for
the results in Chapter 2, also influence consumption patterns and subjective well-
being and therefore have potentially wide ranging welfare implications (Frank 1999,
3
Layard 2005). The results presented in Chapter 3 potentially also provide new in-
sights into other markets where long-term relationships and relational contracts are
common features of market interaction, e.g., lender-borrower relations in the credit
market (Boot 2000). Finally, competition in tournaments and other contest-like
environments is highly relevant in many fields of economic and social life, such as
R & D races (Taylor 1995), politics (Hillman and Riley 1989), sports (Ehrenberg
and Bognanno 1990), or broiler production (Knoeber and Thurman 1994).
In the first chapter of this dissertation, we analyze the intrapersonal relationship
between trust and reciprocity. While obviously trust and reciprocity are connected
in the sense that the expected returns to trust are higher when interacting with a
reciprocal trading partner, surprisingly little is known about whether individuals
with different degrees of reciprocal inclinations also differ in their trusting behavior.
In other words, do reciprocal persons trust more or less compared to more selfish
ones?
To study this question, we employ a variant of the trust game (Berg et al. 1995)
that allows us to measure both variables on an individual basis. Our main result
shows a strong and positive relation between a person’s reciprocity and her trusting
behavior. Reciprocal players exhibit much higher levels of trust than more selfish
individuals. This effect is highly robust, e.g., if we control for the influence of gender
or risk attitudes.
Substantial amounts of trust, but also a high degree of heterogeneity in trusting
behavior are key findings in empirical trust research. This variability raises the ques-
tion whether a person’s preferences or individual characteristics are systematically
related to her behavior in situations involving trust. Recently, several determinants
of trust have been identified, including risk attitudes (Dohmen et al. 2006), fear
of betrayal (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004), gender (Buchan et al. 2008), or indi-
viduals’ genetic predisposition (Reuter et al. 2008). Our findings further enhance
understanding of differences in trusting behavior, showing that a person’s reciprocal
inclination and, hence, her own trustworthiness is strongly related to trust.
Exploring the link between an individual’s trusting behavior and her reciprocal
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inclination is also of high importance for the evaluation and further development
of theories that incorporate social preferences. Most of these theories assume—at
least implicitly—a certain connection between the two variables. Some of the most
prominent models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) predict
that individuals who are more reciprocal or inequity averse ceteris paribus trust
less than others in the trust game. The intuition for this result is simple: a selfish
sender just suffers from the loss of her investment if the receiver sends back too
little, whereas a fair-minded sender experiences additional distress because his trust
has been exploited. Our finding of a strong and positive relationship between trust
and reciprocity suggests that this intuition may be too simplistic and that models of
social preferences should be extended, e.g., to account for non-common expectations
of different types.
In Chapter 2, we study a situation where trust and reciprocity could be par-
ticularly conducive to increase efficiency of economic interactions—gift exchange
in employer-employee relationships. In recent years, a vast body of literature has
stressed the importance of reciprocity for mitigating moral hazard problems of in-
complete contracts: since many agents repay a gift in the form of higher wages by
providing higher efforts, effort can be elicited under incomplete contracts even in
one-shot situations where no future gains can be expected (e.g., Akerlof 1982, Fehr
et al. 1997, Hannan et al. 2002, Fehr and Falk 2002, Maximiano et al. 2007).
The potential of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device, however, is
likely to depend on the institutions that shape the employment relation, above all
the mode of payment. A key question in this context is how to treat agents relative
to each other as this affects the perceived fairness of a pay scheme. In Chapter 2,
we study this question by analyzing two important fairness principles: horizontal
equality and equity.
The specific wage institution we consider is wage equality. Paying equal wages
to workers on the same level of a hierarchy is common practice in many firms (e.g.,
Medoff and Abraham 1980, Baker et al. 1988). Several reasons for equal wages have
been brought forward, amongst them increased peer monitoring (Knez and Simester
2001) and lower transaction costs since contracts do not have to be negotiated with
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every worker individually (see also Prendergast 1999). In addition, a concern for
fairness has been a main argument invoked to justify equal wages. It has been
argued that differential pay of co-workers is considered unfair by workers, causes
resentment and envy within the workforce, and ultimately lower performance (Pfeffer
and Langton 1993, Bewley 1999). Equality is also often referred to in employer-union
bargaining as being a cornerstone of a fair wage scheme.
However, it could be that wage equality hampers the effectiveness of gift ex-
change. This is likely to be the case if agents do not primarily consider wage equality
as fair, but rather care about horizontal equity (Adams 1963). In a work environ-
ment, the equity principle (or “equity norm”) demands that a person who exerts
higher effort should receive a higher wage compared to his co-worker. Only when
performance of co-workers is the same, equity and equality coincide.
In this chapter, we study the relative importance of these fairness principles
by analyzing their efficiency implications when contract enforcement relies on gift
exchange. We do so in a simple and parsimonious laboratory experiment in which
one principal interacts with two agents. In a first stage the agents exert costly effort.
After observing their efforts, the principal pays them a wage. In the main treatment
he can choose the level of the wage but he is obliged to pay the same wage to both
agents (equal wage treatment or EWT). In the control treatment, the principal can
wage discriminate between the two agents (individual wage treatment or IWT). In
both treatments, neither efforts nor wages are contractible.
The main findings of the experiment are as follows. First, performance differs
substantially between the EWT and the IWT: agents who are paid equal wages exert
significantly lower efforts than agents who are paid individually. Effort levels are
nearly twice as high under individual wages. In addition, efforts decline over time
when equal wages are paid. Second, this strong treatment effect cannot be explained
by differences in monetary incentives. The actual wage choices of principals imply
that providing high effort levels is profitable for agents in both treatments. From
a purely monetary viewpoint agents’ behavior in both treatments should thus be
similar. Third, we show that the frequent violation of the equity norm in the equal
wage treatment can explain the effort differences between the treatments. In both
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treatments, agents who exert a higher effort and earn a lower payoff than their co-
worker strongly decrease their effort in the next period. This pattern is very similar
in both treatments. However, the norm of equity is violated much more frequently
under equal wages. Principals in the IWT understand these mechanisms quite well.
When efforts differ they do pay different wages, rewarding the harder-working agent
with a higher payoff in most cases.
Our results suggest a psychological rationale for using individual wages. Sub-
jects perceive equal wages for unequal performance as unfair and reduce their effort
subsequently. The traditional literature on incentive provision in groups comes to
a similar conclusion though for a different reason. It is usually argued that the
inefficiency of equal wages stems from the fact that marginal products and wages
are not aligned. This can lead to free-riding among selfish agents (e.g., Holmstro¨m
1982, Erev et al. 1993). We enlarge the scope of this critical view on wage equality:
interestingly, in our setup it is precisely the presence of fair-minded agents and not
their absence that calls for the use of individual rewards.
Regarding compensation practice in firms, our findings highlight the importance
of taking the concerns for co-workers’ wages into account. However, doing so by
paying equal wages to a group of agents may actually do more harm than good.
As soon as agents differ in their performance, equal wages which seem to be a fair
institution at first sight might be considered very unfair. While the discouraging
effect of equal wages on hard-working agents has long been informally discussed
(e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 418f) this chapter provides controlled evidence
in favor of this intuition. Moreover, it suggests that it is the violation of the norm
of equity that causes the discouragement and low performance.
The results of Chapter 2—in particular, the performance of agents under in-
dividual wages—show how powerful gift exchange can be in eliciting work effort:
although explicit contract enforcement is not feasible, 80% of the possible efficiency
gains are realized. However, while gift exchange and other forms of implicit con-
tracts might be successful in eliciting high work efforts, they could have less desirable
consequences for other labor market outcomes. In particular, some instruments of
implicit contract enforcement could give rise to involuntary unemployment. For in-
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stance, when employment relations are based on fair wages and gift exchange, it
could be optimal for firms to dismiss workers rather than cut wages in times of
economic downturns (Bewley 1999). More generally, firms might prefer to ration
jobs because the requirement to pay fair wages could render less productive jobs
unprofitable. Finally, the presence of unemployed workers could itself be necessary
to motivate employed workers to work hard (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, MacLeod
and Malcomson 1989).
In Chapter 3, we empirically analyze the relationship between contract enforce-
ment and the emergence of unemployment. In particular, we are interested in
whether the absence of third party contract enforcement has a direct impact on
the level of unemployment. Moreover, we study how different instruments of im-
plicit contracting—such as reputation in relational contracts, gift exchange, and an
implicit threat of dismissal—interact in determining labor market outcomes. Do
firms, for instance, ration jobs but share production rents generously when effort
is not verifiable? Do they engage in repeated, long-term work relationships? How
does unemployment influence workers’ effort provision?
We address these questions in an experimental labor market where we exoge-
nously vary the verifiability of work effort. In the market, firms and workers inter-
act during multiple market periods. In every period, each firm can hire up to two
workers. In addition to the analysis in the previous chapters, we allow firms and
workers to trade repeatedly. This allows the trading parties to build up long-term
work relationships and make use of relational contracts as an additional means of
providing incentives. Our two experimental treatments only differ in the degree to
which work effort of employed workers is explicitly enforced. In our control treat-
ment, concluded contracts are exogenously enforced, i.e., a worker’s effort has to be
equal to the desired effort level stipulated in the employment contract. By contrast,
effort in our main treatment is not verifiable, and firm and workers therefore have
to rely on implicit incentives.
Our experiment yields the following findings. Unemployment is much higher
in the treatment where effort is not verifiable. More importantly, unemployment
in this treatment is involuntary, being caused by the firms’ employment and con-
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tracting policy. Firms pay “fair” wages but offer fewer vacancies than possible and
technologically efficient. By contrast, wages are close to the market clearing level
when contracts are explicitly enforced. Firms do not ration jobs, and unemployment
is very low. Moreover, unemployment in this treatment is mostly voluntary, being
caused by workers who do not accept existing contract offers.
The firms’ employment policy in the treatment without explicit contract enforce-
ment, however, again succeeds in eliciting high efforts from the employed workers.
One reason why this is the case is that many firms build up repeated relationships
with specific workers. These long-term work relationships are characterized by high
wages and high effort levels, thus yielding positive rents both for firms and workers.
Providing high efforts in response to high wages is profitable for the workers because
of two reasons. First, firms do not rehire workers who shirked in previous periods.
At the same time, a job loss entails considerable costs for the workers: due to the
high level of unemployment, the job acquisition rate for unemployed workers is very
low. Our findings therefore lend support to theories of efficiency wages based on
gift exchange (e.g. Akerlof 1982) as well as models of unemployment as a worker
disciplining device (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).
In Chapter 4, we analyze a different source of performance incentives for employ-
ees in many occupations—the prospect of being promoted to better paid positions
at higher organizational levels. According to Lazear and Gibbs (2008), promotions
are probably the most important source of extrinsic motivation for middle managers
in most firms. Using promotions as an instrument for incentive provision is espe-
cially important when other, more direct means of pay-for-performance are absent,
e.g., because it is not feasible to measure individual performance objectively. In
the multi-level hierarchies of most modern organizations, employees promoted at
one level have the chance to compete for further promotions, giving rise to “elim-
ination” tournaments with multiple stages. In such elimination tournaments, the
incentive effect of a promotion does not only stem from the immediate wage increase
but also from the option value of further promotion chances.
Although the importance of multi-stage elimination tournaments is undisputed,
stringent empirical tests of their incentive effects have so far been scarce. In Chap-
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ter 4 we experimentally study the implications of multi-stage tournaments for em-
ployee performance in comparison to single promotion decisions using controlled
laboratory techniques. In addition, we address the question how different wage
structures, i.e., the size of wage jumps between different levels of a hierarchy affect
performance.
We study these questions by comparing three treatments. Our main treatment
is a two-stage tournament (TS) in which four subjects compete for being promoted
to an intermediate level. In a second stage the two promoted subjects compete
again for the top position. The promotion decision depends on costly effort and
an individual noise term. We compare this treatment to a one-stage tournament
(OS) in which four subjects compete once for two top positions. The wage for
the promoted subjects is chosen such that the one-stage tournament is strategically
equivalent to the first stage of TS, i.e., equilibrium efforts are the same in both
treatments. Comparing OS and TS thus allows testing whether subjects take the
option value in multi-stage tournaments into account and evaluate it correctly. In
a third treatment (TSC), we analyze whether a more convex wage profile leads to
reduced first stage efforts and increased efforts in the second stage of the elimination
tournament as predicted by theory.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: First, confirming previous evidence,
the predictions of tournament theory are remarkably close to average behavior in our
one-stage treatment. Second, behavior in the TS treatment indicates that subjects
take into account the option value of future promotion possibilities when deciding on
their work effort in multi-stage tournaments. However, we also observe important
departures from theoretical predictions in this tournament. Behavior in the first
stage of TS differs strongly both from the one-stage treatment and from theoretical
predictions. Subjects exert significantly higher effort in the first stage of the two-
stage tournament. This excess exertion of effort is, however, not observed in the
second stage of the two-stage tournament. Finally, the results of the TSC treatment
suggest that excess effort in the first stage of two-stage tournaments is a robust
finding. Subjects hardly react to the change in the wage structure, implying that
first-stage excess effort is even higher in TSC.
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Our results enhance the understanding of incentive effects in complex multi-stage
promotion tournaments. They indicate that the mechanisms of incentive provision
in multi-stage tournaments largely operate as suggested by theory. People do not
only respond to the immediate increase in wages but also seem to be motivated
by the option value entailed in future promotion possibilities. Our findings also
provide insights with regard to the question whether one-stage tournaments are
behaviorally equivalent to multi-stage designs. Adding one or more stages seems to
make a fundamental difference, as people tend to exert excess effort in early stages
of the tournament. This shows that one cannot necessarily draw inferences from
simple one-stage setups to more complex tournaments.
The finding that people tend to exert excess effort in early stages of a multi-stage
competition also has potentially wide-ranging organizational implications. It sug-
gests that multi-stage elimination tournaments can be a particularly effective form
of providing incentives because they elicit unusually high work efforts at the lower
levels of a hierarchy. Ultimately, this could help to explain why firms rely so heavily
on promotion based incentive schemes even if more direct means of performance
assessment and compensation are available.1
1Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Matthias Wibral (Altmann et al.
2008). Chapter 2 was developed jointly with Johannes Abeler, Sebastian Kube, and Matthias
Wibral. An earlier version of this chapter was circulated under the title “Reciprocity and Payment
Schemes: When Equality is Unfair”. Chapter 3 owes to the collaboration with Armin Falk and
David Huffman. Chapter 4 is joint work with Armin Falk and Matthias Wibral and was circulated
under the title “Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multi-Stage Elimination Tournaments”.
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Chapter 1
Do the Reciprocal Trust Less?
1.1 Introduction
By now there seems to be broad agreement that trust and reciprocity are conducive
to economic performance and efficiency (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997). Mutual trust
between trading parties facilitates the realization of gains from trade, for instance
by reducing contracting costs. Reciprocity can also enhance performance in many
areas of economic life, for example by mitigating moral hazard problems in labor
relations (Fehr et al. 1997). In order to better understand the economic implications
of reciprocity, several formal models of social preferences have been developed (e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Falk and Fischbacher 2006).
In spite of the importance of trust and reciprocity surprisingly little is known
about their relationship on an intrapersonal level. In other words, do reciprocal
persons trust more or less than selfish ones? In this chapter we address precisely this
question with the help of a controlled laboratory experiment, employing a variant
of the trust game that allows us to measure both variables for each individual.1
1Several studies (e.g., Cox 2004, Ashraf et al. 2006) have analyzed behavior across games in
order to disentangle subjects’ unconditional kindness or altruism from trust and reciprocity, but
these studies do not look at the direct link between a person’s (own) reciprocity and trust. In
addition, it is not clear to what extent inferences can be made from behavior in non-strategic
environments (e.g., the dictator game) to players’ motives in strategic interactions. See Fehr and
Schmidt (2006) for a discussion of this point.
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We find a strong and positive relationship between a person’s reciprocity and
her trusting behavior. Reciprocal players exhibit much higher levels of trust than
more selfish ones, even when personal characteristics and preferences such as gender
or risk attitudes are controlled for. This finding is also interesting from a theo-
retical perspective because theories of social preferences typically assume—at least
implicitly—a connection between trust and reciprocity. In particular, the observed
positive relation between the two raises important questions about theories which
predict that ceteris paribus “fairer” players trust less.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes
the design of our experiment, Section 1.3 presents the empirical results. Section
1.4 concludes by discussing the implications of our findings for modelling social
preferences.
1.2 Experimental Design
In our experiment, subjects were anonymously matched in pairs and played a mod-
ified version of the trust game (Berg et al. 1995). Both players received an en-
dowment of 120 points. The first mover (the sender) could send any amount
t ∈ {0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120} to the second mover (the receiver). The amount
sent was tripled by the experimenter. Then, the second mover could send back any
amount between zero and 480 points. The crucial feature that distinguishes our
design from the original version of the trust game is the use of the strategy method
to elicit each subject’s trust and reciprocal inclination. In our experiment, subjects
made decisions both in the role of the sender and the receiver. In the role of the
receiver subjects had to decide how much to send back for any possible amount
received. This procedure allows us to measure both the level of trust and the level
of reciprocity for each subject in the same strategic environment.2
To give subjects the monetary incentives to take all decisions seriously while
2Other studies have employed the strategy method in trust games in which subjects play only
one role (e.g., Bellemare and Kro¨ger 2007, Falk and Zehnder 2007). Burks et al. (2003) have
subjects play both roles but do not use the strategy method.
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at the same time avoiding potential confounds if subjects interact repeatedly in
different roles, we employed the following incentive-compatible procedure. After all
decisions had been made, a random mechanism determined which player of a given
pair actually had the role of the sender and which player had the receiver role. Then,
players’ decisions were implemented and subjects were paid accordingly.
The experiment was programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007)
and conducted at the BonnEconLab. Twenty subjects participated in each of the
12 sessions that we ran so that we observe the choices of 240 different subjects.
The trust game was part of a sequence of tasks (see Dohmen and Falk 2006 for a
detailed description). Before subjects played the trust game they had to solve math
problems under different monetary incentives.3
After the trust game, we elicited subjects’ risk attitudes using a series of 15
choices between a safe payment and a lottery. The lottery was the same across
choices (400 points or 0 points, each with probability 0.5) while the safe option in-
creased from 25 points to 375 points in increments of 25. If subjects have monotonous
preferences, they prefer the lottery up to a certain level of the safe option, and then
switch to preferring the safe option in all subsequent choices. After a subject had
made decisions for all 15 choices, it was randomly determined which choice became
relevant for payment.4 Together, the trust game and the lottery choice task lasted
about 20-25 minutes and subjects earned 6.87 Euro on average.
1.3 Results
We measure trust by the amount that a subject sends as a first mover. Our measure
of reciprocity (also denoted “r”) is derived as follows: for each subject, we used the
3 In 4 of the 12 sessions subjects worked under purely individual incentives (fixed wages and piece
rates). In the remaining 8 sessions they could select into an incentive scheme (team or tournament)
which involved anonymous interaction with another player. All subjects were randomly rematched
in the trust game. In view of our results we are confident that neither solving math problems nor
the different incentive schemes systematically affect behavior in the trust game (see below).
4The experimental instructions for the trust game can be found in Appendix A.1. Except for
the payoff parameters, the lottery procedure was identical to the one described in Appendix D.7.
15
decisions as a second mover and ran an OLS-regression of the amounts sent back
on the (hypothetical) amounts sent by the opponent, forcing the slope through the
origin. The slope coefficient gives us a measure of a subject’s willingness to reward
kind actions of an opponent by own kind behavior, i.e., positive reciprocity. If a
receiver, for example, always matches his final payoff with that of the sender, his
reciprocity coefficient is r = 2.
In order to graphically present our main result, we classify subjects according
to their behavior as second movers. We call subjects with a reciprocity parameter
r > 1 “reciprocal”, and subjects with a slope parameter r = 0 “selfish”. Reciprocal
types leave their opponent with a positive return to trust, sending back more than
the amount sent to them by the sender. 64.6% of our subjects fall into this category.
Selfish types, who make up 12.5% of subjects, never send back anything, irrespec-
tive of the first mover’s behavior. The remaining 22.9% of subjects whose slope
parameter is positive, but small (r ≤ 1) are categorized as “intermediate” types.
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Figure 1.1: Average amount sent by selfish, intermediate, and reciprocal players.
Figure 1.1 plots the amount that the three types of subjects send on average in
the trust game. Reciprocal types clearly send most (69.2 points on average), and
selfish types send least (23.3 points). Subjects in the intermediate category send
43.6 points. Pairwise Mann-Whitney-U-tests indicate that all differences between
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the groups are highly statistically significant (p < 0.01 for all pairwise tests). Sub-
jects who always “split the pie equally” as a responder (i.e., subjects with r = 2)
trust most (83.5 points). The result depicted in Figure 1.1 is robust to different
classifications of types using a finer “grid”.
OLS-regressions of individuals’ trust, measured by the amount sent in the trust
game, on their reciprocal inclination, measured by the slope parameter r described
above, confirm that reciprocal individuals trust more: an increase of one unit in the
reciprocity measure is associated with sending 16.1 points more in the trust game
(see Column (1) of Table 1.1).5
Dependent variable: Amount sent
(1) (2) (3)
Reciprocity 16.091*** 17.234*** 17.761***
(2.235) (2.199) (2.316)
1 if male 16.301*** 15.167***
(4.401) (4.688)
Certainty equivalent 0.100**
(0.044)
Constant 34.081*** 24.329*** 3.665
(3.957) (4.668) (10.151)
R2 adj. 0.175 0.217 0.230
Observations 240 240 221
Table 1.1: Trust-Regressions. OLS estimates (standard errors in parentheses).
“Certainty Equivalent” indicates the switch from the risky lottery to the safe option
(=0 if subject is strongly risk averse, ..., =400 if subject is strongly risk loving).
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
This key result is also robust to controlling for gender (cf. Column (2) of Table
1.1) and subjects’ risk attitudes (cf. Column (3) in Table 1.1).6 The positive influence
5This result still holds if we restrict the sample to the 4 sessions in which there was no interaction
between subjects in the tasks preceding the trust game. In addition, we find the significant positive
correlation between trust and reciprocity in the remaining 8 sessions irrespective of the chosen
incentive scheme.
6The certainty equivalent cannot be determined unambiguously for 19 subjects because they
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of reciprocity on trust is highly significant and also quantitatively very similar in
all specifications. The effects of gender and risk attitudes are consistent with the
findings in the literature. Men trust more than women (cf. Bohnet and Zeckhauser
2004), sending about 15 points more than female participants in our sample. Our
results also confirm the importance of risk attitudes for trusting behavior: subjects
who are more willing to take risks send significantly more (cf. Dohmen et al. 2006).
1.4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The strong, positive relationship between a person’s reciprocal inclination and her
trusting behavior has important implications for the evaluation and advancement
of theories that incorporate social preferences. Some of the most prominent models
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Falk and Fischbacher
2006) predict that individuals who are more reciprocal (or inequity averse) ceteris
paribus trust less than others in the trust game. The intuition for this result is that
a selfish sender just suffers from the loss of her investment if the receiver sends back
too little, whereas a fair-minded sender experiences additional disutility because his
trust has been exploited.7
Our results show, however, that the relationship between trust and reciprocity
may be more complex than captured by most models. The finding that people
trust more the more reciprocal they are allows at least two different preliminary
interpretations—one based on norm adherence and the other on systematic differ-
ences in beliefs. The idea of the former is that some people value adherence to
a certain moral norm in itself. If these people follow a norm that, e.g., dictates
cooperative behavior in either role, this could account for our main finding. Such
norm-guided behavior could also help to explain why some senders in trust games
send positive amounts despite expecting to get back less than they send (cf. Dufwen-
switched more than once between the safe option and the lottery. These subjects were excluded
from the regression in Column (3). Including them with the lowest or highest switching point from
the lottery to the safe option does not change the results.
7Along these lines, Fehr et al. (2007) have argued that “fairness preferences inhibit trusting
behavior because trust typically involves a risk of being cheated.”
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berg and Gneezy 2000, Ashraf et al. 2006).
A different interpretation is that fair and selfish types have fundamentally differ-
ent beliefs regarding the behavior of others. Such differences in beliefs might be the
result of a “false consensus effect” (Kelley and Stahelski 1970). As an extreme exam-
ple, assume that reciprocal players expect all others to behave reciprocally, and that
a selfish subject expects all others to be selfish as well. In this case reciprocal types
will send positive amounts and expect a positive return, while selfish types will never
send anything since they expect that the receiver will not send anything back. Such
systematic differences in beliefs would have interesting implications for the mod-
elling of social preferences as they require giving up the widely used common-prior
assumption. They potentially also have important practical implications as they
could lead different types of players to select into different institutional settings.
This could help to explain why environments with different degrees of exogenous
enforcement coexist, e.g., in the labor market. Which of the two interpretations is
more relevant cannot be answered with our data but remains an important question
for future research.
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Chapter 2
When Equality is Unfair
“To treat people fairly you have to treat people differently.”
Roy Roberts, at that time VP of General Motors1
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, a vast body of literature has stressed the importance of gift exchange
for mitigating moral-hazard problems of incomplete contracts: since many agents
repay a gift in the form of higher wages by providing higher efforts, effort can be
elicited under contractual incompleteness even in one-shot situations where no future
gains can be expected (e.g., Akerlof 1982, Fehr et al. 1997, Maximiano et al. 2007).
The potential of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device, however, is likely to
depend on the institutions that shape the employment relation, above all the mode
of payment. Yet little is known about the interaction of different payment modes
with gift exchange. Exploring this interaction is crucial in order to understand under
which conditions the efficiency-enhancing effects of gift exchange develop their full
power. A key question in this context is how to treat agents relative to each other
as this affects the perceived fairness of a pay scheme. In this chapter, we study this
question by focusing on two important fairness principles: horizontal equality and
equity.
1Quoted in Baker et al. (1988).
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On the one hand, it has been argued that horizontal equality is crucial for a
wage scheme to be considered as fair. Differential pay of co-workers could cause
resentment and envy within the workforce, and ultimately lower performance (e.g.,
Pfeffer and Langton 1993, Bewley 1999). Wage equality is also often referred to in
employer-union bargaining as being a cornerstone of a fair wage scheme and is one of
the most prevalent payment modes (see, e.g., Medoff and Abraham 1980, Baker et al.
1988). If workers care foremost about equality, a wage scheme that guarantees equal
wages for co-workers should lead to an efficiency-enhancing gift exchange relation.
On the other hand, the importance of the equity principle has long been discussed in
social psychology, personnel management, and economics (e.g., Homans 1961, Fehr
and Schmidt 1999, Konow 2003). In a work environment, the equity principle (or
“equity norm”) demands that a person who exerts higher effort should receive a
higher wage compared to his co-worker. Only when performance of co-workers is
the same, equity and equality coincide. However, in real-life work relations this is
likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Whenever workers differ in their
performance, horizontal wage equality violates the equity principle since a higher
effort is not rewarded with a higher wage. In other words, if equity is important,
the often-heard slogan “equal pay for equal work” implies “unequal pay for unequal
work”.2
Ideally, our research question would be examined in work environments that
differ only with respect to the payment mode. To come close to this ideal world,
we introduce a simple and parsimonious laboratory experiment that allows us to
analyze the interaction between the institution of wage equality and gift exchange.
In the experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. In a first stage the
agents exert costly effort. After observing their efforts, the principal pays them
a wage. In the main treatment he can choose the level of the wage but he is
obliged to pay the same wage to both agents (equal wage treatment or EWT). In
2Lazear (1989) neatly summarizes this discussion (p. 561): “It is common for both management
and worker groups such as labor unions to express a desire for homogeneous wage treatment. The
desire for similar treatment is frequently articulated as an attempt to preserve worker unity, to
maintain good morale, and to create a cooperative work environment. But it is far from obvious
that pay equality has these effects.”
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the control treatment, the principal can wage discriminate between the two agents
(individual wage treatment or IWT). In both treatments, neither efforts nor wages
are contractible. Note that principals in the individual wage treatment are free to
pay the same wage to both agents, i.e., the EWT is a special case of the IWT.
If agents care foremost about wage equality, there should thus be no treatment
difference; if equity considerations are more important, we should find that the
EWT elicits lower effort levels than the IWT.
The main findings of the experiment are as follows. First, performance differs
substantially between the EWT and the IWT: agents who are paid equal wages
exert significantly lower efforts than agents who are paid individually. Effort levels
are nearly twice as high under individual wages and efforts decline over time when
equal wages are paid. Second, this strong treatment effect cannot be explained
by differences in monetary incentives. The actual wage choices of principals imply
that providing high effort levels is profitable for agents in both treatments. From
a purely monetary viewpoint agents’ behavior in both treatments should thus be
similar. Third, we show that the frequent violation of the equity principle in the
equal wage treatment can explain the effort differences between the treatments. In
both treatments, agents who exert a higher effort and earn a lower payoff than
their co-worker strongly decrease their effort in the next period. However, the norm
of equity is violated much more frequently under equal wages. Principals in the
IWT understand the mechanisms of equity quite well. When efforts differ they do
pay different wages, rewarding the harder-working agent with a higher payoff in
most cases. Agents’ reactions cause completely different dynamics in the two main
treatments. Under equal wages, initially hard-working agents get discouraged and
reduce their effort to the level of their low-performing co-workers. By contrast, in
the individual wage treatment the high performers keep exerting high efforts while
the low performers change their behavior and strongly increase their effort levels.
Note that principals in the IWT can set two wages instead of one in the EWT.
This opens the possibility that agents attribute a different degree of intentionality
to principals’ wage choices. It could be that this additional moment of discretion
has a direct impact on the treatment difference. To rule out this potential confound,
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we conduct an additional control treatment where principals can again set only one
wage as in the EWT. The second wage is set exogenously such that the equity
principle is always fulfilled. Effort levels in the control treatment are similar to
those of the IWT and much higher compared to the EWT. This confirms that the
difference between our two main treatments is indeed driven by agents’ desire for
wages that are in line with the equity principle.
Our results suggest a psychological rationale for using individual wages. Sub-
jects perceive equal wages for unequal performance as unfair and reduce their effort
subsequently. The traditional literature on incentive provision in groups comes to
a similar conclusion though for a different reason. It is usually argued that the
inefficiency of equal wages stems from the fact that marginal products and wages
are not aligned. This can lead to free-riding among selfish agents (e.g., Holmstro¨m
1982, Erev et al. 1993). We enlarge the scope of this critical view on wage equality:
interestingly, in our setup it is precisely the presence of fair-minded agents and not
their absence that calls for the use of individual rewards.
An earlier literature in social psychology also studies the consequences of equity
in social exchanges (Homans 1961, Adams 1963, Adams 1965, Andrews 1967). In his
influential equity theory, Adams (1965) operationalizes the general equity principle
in an “equity formula”, which states that the ratio of outcomes to inputs should
be the same for every individual.3 If this is not the case an individual experiences
distress and seeks to reestablish equity. Our study complements this literature in
several ways. As Mowday (1991) notes, interpreting the existing empirical evidence
can often be difficult because important aspects such as the costs of effort or the
relevant reference group are ambiguous. Our economic laboratory experiment offers
a high level of control over these aspects. In addition, violations of the equity norm
arise from the interaction of principals and agents in our study whereas they are
induced by the experimenter in most earlier experiments, e.g., by making subjects
believe they are over- or underqualified for the job (e.g., Adams 1963 or Lawler
1967).
3The idea of proportionality dates back to at least Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
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Since agents in our experiment compare their payoff with the payoff of their
co-worker, our results also inform the literature analyzing the influence of relative
income on satisfaction and performance. It has been shown that relative income
affects people’s well-being (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996, Easterlin 2001, Fließbach
et al. 2007). However, it is less clear how this influences performance, i.e., whether
low relative income leads to frustration and reduced performance (as in Clark et al.
2006 and Torgler et al. 2006) or to an increase in performance due to a “positional
arms race” (Neumark and Postlewaite 1998, Layard 2005, Bowles and Park 2005).
The controlled laboratory environment of our experiment allows us to reconcile
these differing views. Our results indicate that the comparison process goes beyond
a one-dimensional comparison of income and also includes a comparison of effort.
In particular, they suggest that receiving a lower income while exerting a higher
effort leads to reduced performance as this conflicts with the equity principle. By
contrast, a lower income that is generated by a lower effort leads to a (small) increase
in performance.
There are only a few experimental studies that analyze the interaction of pay-
ment modes and social preferences (e.g., Bandiera et al. 2005, Fehr et al. 2007,
Falk, Huffman and MacLeod 2008). Most closely related to this chapter is the work
of Charness and Kuhn (2007). Here, one principal is matched with two agents
differing in productivity; like in our study, wages and efforts are not contractible.
In contrast to our results, they find that co-workers’ wages do not matter much
for agents’ decisions. However, their design differs from ours in several important
points. While Charness and Kuhn focus on heterogeneity in productivity, we look
at the effect of actual output differences between agents. Furthermore, we allow for
richer comparisons between the agents, as in their design agents are not aware of
the magnitude and direction of the productivity differences. The different results
underline the importance of information for determining the reference group: Char-
ness and Kuhn’s results rather apply to groups of workers that are loosely related
and know little about each other, while our focus is on close co-workers who have a
good understanding about their peers’ abilities and efforts.
Regarding compensation practice in firms, our findings highlight the importance
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of taking the concerns for co-workers’ wages into account. However, doing so by
paying equal wages to a group of agents may actually do more harm than good.
As soon as agents differ in their performance, equal wages which seem to be a fair
institution at first sight might be considered very unfair. While the discouraging
effect of equal wages on hard-working agents has long been informally discussed
(e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 418f) we provide controlled evidence in favor
of this intuition. Moreover, our findings suggest that it is the violation of the norm
of equity that causes the discouragement and low performance. Our results should
not be interpreted as arguments against wage equality in general. They rather point
to limits of equal wages.4 Wage equality is potentially a good choice in occupations
where, e.g., due to technological reasons, workers’ performance differs only slightly
or where performance differences are due to random influences. In addition, the
transparency of co-workers’ work efforts and wages might have an influence on the
optimal choice of the pay scheme.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we
describe the experimental design and discuss theoretical predictions. In Section 2.3
we present and discuss our results and Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Setup
2.2.1 Design and Procedures
In the experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The subjects play a
two-stage game. In the first stage, agents decide simultaneously and independently
how much effort they want to provide. Exerting effort is costly for the agents. Effort
choices range from 1 to 10 and are associated with a convex cost function displayed
in Table 2.1. The principal reaps the benefits of production: every unit of effort
increases his payoff by 10.
4Independent of equity-equality trade-offs, equal wages might be beneficial for the principal
because they could increase peer monitoring (Knez and Simester 2001) and lower transaction costs
since contracts do not have to be negotiated with every worker individually (e.g., Prendergast
1999).
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Effort level ei 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost of effort c(ei) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20
Table 2.1: Cost of effort.
In the second stage, after observing the effort decisions of his agents, the principal
decides on wages for the two agents. The wages have to be between 0 and 100.
Neither efforts nor wages are contractible. The only difference between treatments
is the mode of payment. In our main treatment the principal can only choose one
wage w that is paid to each of the agents (equal wage treatment or EWT). In the
control treatment he can discriminate between the two agents by choosing wages
w1 and w2 for agent 1 and 2, respectively (individual wage treatment or IWT). The
EWT is thus a special case of the IWT. At the end of each period, the two agents
and the principal are informed about efforts, wage(s), and the resulting payoffs for
all three players. The payoff functions for the players are summarized in Table 2.2.
Treatment EWT IWT
Payoff Principal piP = 10(e1 + e2)− 2w piP = 10(e1 + e2)− (w1 + w2)
Payoff Agent i piAi = w − c(ei) piAi = wi − c(ei)
Table 2.2: Payoffs of players.
This game is played for twelve periods. We implemented a stranger design to
abstract from confounding reputation effects, i.e., at the beginning of each period
principals and agents were rematched anonymously and randomly within a matching
group. A matching group consisted of three principals and six agents. The subjects
kept their roles throughout the entire experiment. After the last period, subjects
answered a short post-experimental questionnaire. The experiment was conducted
in a labor market framing, i.e., principals were called “employers” and agents were
called “employees”.5
5An English translation of the instructions can be found in Appendix B.2.
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Our setup is related to the gift-exchange game introduced by Fehr et al. (1993)
but differs in two important ways. First, in our experiment agents move first while in
Fehr et al.’s setup the principal moves first. Our move order allows the principal to
base his wage decision on the actually exerted effort. More importantly, a principal
in our experiment is matched with two agents instead of one. This is an essential
prerequisite to analyze the interaction between gift exchange and payment modes.
It allows us to study the impact of relative wages on the perceived fairness of the
wage scheme and agents’ behavior.
All participants started the experiment with an initial endowment of 400 points
that also served as their show-up fee. Points earned were converted at an exchange
rate of 0.01 Euro/point. The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab at
the University of Bonn in April 2005 using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). For each
treatment, we ran four sessions with a total of 8 matching groups (144 participants).
The experiment lasted approximately 70 minutes. On average subjects earned 8.30
Euro.
2.2.2 Behavioral Predictions
Efficiency is determined by agents’ effort choices. It is maximized if both agents
exert the highest possible effort of 10. However, if all players are rational and selfish
the principal will not pay anything to the agents since wage payments only reduce
his monetary payoff. Anticipating this, both agents will provide the minimal effort
of one in the first stage. The finite repetition of the game in randomly rematched
groups does not change this prediction. This subgame perfect equilibrium is the
same for both payment modes. If all players were selfish we should therefore expect
no difference between treatments.
By contrast, in laboratory experiments studying labor relations with incomplete
contracts, one typically observes that efforts and wages exceed the smallest possible
value. Moreover, wages and efforts are positively correlated (e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter
2000). These findings illustrate the potential of reciprocal gift exchange in enforcing
incomplete contracts, as postulated in Akerlof and Yellen’s fair wage-effort hypoth-
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esis (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). A fundamental prerequisite for the functioning of
gift-exchange relations is that workers perceive their wage as fair. The fairness of
a wage payment, however, may not only be evaluated in absolute terms, but also
relative to the wages of other members in a worker’s reference group.6 This is not
important for the special case of bilateral gift-exchange relationships where only
one agent interacts with one principal (e.g., Fehr et al. 1997). However, horizontal
fairness considerations potentially play a crucial role in our setup where workers can
compare to co-workers.
How do the behavioral predictions depend on which horizontal fairness principle
is most important? If agents in the experiment care foremost about wage equality,
the EWT—which guarantees equal wages by design—should lead to efficient gift
exchange between firms and workers. Additionally, we should expect no behavioral
differences between treatments since firms in the IWT can pay their workers equal
wages, too. Given that firms in the IWT recognize workers’ desire for equal treat-
ment, they will decide to do so. Thus, the wage-effort relationship and average
effort levels should not differ across treatments. If some firms do nevertheless wage
discriminate between workers, the IWT should lead to less efficient outcomes than
the EWT.
By contrast, if workers consider equity to be more important than equality, we
should expect differences in behavior between treatments. The equity principle de-
mands that a person who exerts higher effort than his co-worker should receive a
higher wage and payoff. Our experimental treatments differ in the extent to which
the equity principle can be fulfilled by principals. Under the equal wage institution,
the equity norm is violated whenever agents differ in their performance. Since both
workers receive the same wage but have to bear the cost of effort provision, the
worker who exerts more effort receives a lower monetary payoff. Under individual
wages, principals’ behavior determines endogenously whether the equity norm is vi-
olated or not. By differentiating wages in accordance to effort differences, principals
6Potentially many variables influence a worker’s fairness perception of his wage, e.g., the unem-
ployment rate, unemployment benefits, the prevailing market wage, etc. (see Akerlof 1982, Akerlof
and Yellen 1990). These factors are ruled out by our experimental design, allowing us to isolate
the influence of co-workers’ wages on fairness perception and effort provision.
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can adhere to the norm. If we assume that at least some principals do so, we expect
to see less norm violations in IWT than in EWT.
What are the behavioral consequences of such differences in norm fulfillment?
Agents who value equitable treatment should suffer from norm violations, feel dis-
satisfied and subsequently try to restore equity by adjusting their behavior. Equity
theory proposes several possible reactions of agents after norm violations, such as
altering own or others’ efforts or payoffs, changing one’s reference group or quitting
the relationship (see Adams 1965). The virtue of our experimental design is that we
can clearly identify agents’ reactions, because the only variable that an agent can
change after experiencing a norm violation is his work effort. An agent who faces a
disadvantageous norm violation (i.e., relative underpayment) should lower his effort
in the following period. An agent who experiences an advantageous norm violation
(i.e., relative overpayment) should increase his effort. Note that a norm violation
always includes one agent facing a disadvantageous violation and one agent facing
an advantageous violation. Dissatisfaction and the resulting strength of reactions,
however, is likely to depend on the direction of the norm violation. Previous ev-
idence suggests that the decrease of effort after a disadvantageous norm violation
will be stronger than the increase of effort after an advantageous violation (Loewen-
stein et al. 1989, Mowday 1991, Tho¨ni and Ga¨chter 2008). Consequently, a violation
of the equity norm should lead to an overall decrease of efforts in the subsequent
period.
If workers care about equitable payment in the sense of the postulated equity
norm, aggregate effort in the EWT should thus be lower compared to the IWT since
we expect to observe less norm violations in the latter.
2.3 Results
In this section we present the results of the experiment and discuss possible expla-
nations for the observed behavior. We first analyze efficiency implications of the
two payment schemes by comparing the effort choices of agents. We then demon-
strate that the difference in agents’ performance obtains even though monetary
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incentives—implied by principals’ wage setting—should lead to similar effort choices
in both treatments. Subsequently, we show that workers’ behavior is strongly af-
fected by the equity principle, which is more frequently violated in the EWT. Finally,
we report the results of an additional control experiment. They demonstrate that
the higher efficiency of the IWT is not driven by the fact that principals can set two
wages instead of one (as in the EWT) but by the fact that principals set wages that
are in line with the equity principle.
2.3.1 Effort Choices and Efficiency
Figure 2.1 shows the development of average efforts over time. Under equal wages,
efforts are lower already in the first period (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.03)7 and
decrease over time. Efforts under individual wages stay constant (Wilcoxon test
for periods 1–6 against 7–12: IWT, p = 0.56; EWT, p < 0.01). This results in a
strong overall treatment difference: average efforts are almost twice as high in the
IWT compared to the EWT (8.21 vs. 4.40; Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01). The
treatment difference is also present when individual matching groups are considered:
the highest average effort of an EWT matching group (5.88) is still lower than the
lowest average effort of an IWT matching group (7.47).
The difference in agents’ behavior can also be seen in the histogram of effort
choices (Figure 2.2). In the individual wage treatment agents choose the maximum
effort of 10 in 49% of the cases, 84% of the choices are higher than 6. Under equal
wages, agents choose an effort higher than 6 in only 26% of all cases. The effort
decisions are more spread out in the EWT, the minimal effort of 1 being the modal
choice with 24% of the choices. Since higher efforts increase production and since
the marginal product of effort always exceeds its marginal cost, the differences in
effort provision directly translate into differences in efficiency.
7The comparison of first period effort choices is based on individual observations. Unless oth-
erwise noted, all other tests use matching group averages as independent observations. Reported
p-values are always two-sided.
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Figure 2.1: Average effort per period. The effort is aggregated per period over all
matching groups.
Result 1: The two payment modes exhibit strong differences with respect
to the performance they elicit: agents who are paid equal wages exert
significantly lower efforts than agents who are paid individually. This
results in a much higher efficiency under individual wages.
Both, the agents and the principals benefit from the increase in efficiency. The
average profit per period of a principal is 56 in the EWT compared to 100 in the
IWT (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01), while an agent on average earns 10 under
equal wages vs. 17 under individual wages (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01).
2.3.2 Wage Setting and Monetary Incentives
The strong difference in effort choices suggests that the degree to which gift exchange
can mitigate moral-hazard problems depends on the payment mode that is used.
Wage equality hampers efficiency, and we hypothesized above that this might be
due to horizontal fairness concerns. However, performance differences might also be
driven by differing monetary incentives across treatments. To rule this out, we now
take a closer look at principals’ wage setting and the resulting monetary incentives
for the agents.
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Figure 2.2: Frequency of effort choices.
Figure 2.3 plots the average wage per effort level in the two treatments. For both
treatments we take the wage paid by the principal for each individual effort decision
and calculate averages for a given effort level. The graph exhibits the upward sloping
effort-wage relation of many gift-exchange experiments. For example, an agent in
the equal wage treatment who exerts an effort of 1 receives on average a wage of
6.3 while an agent exerting an effort of 10 receives an average wage of 30.3. In
the individual wage treatment, the corresponding wages are 1.7 and 39.5.8 The
effort-wage relation indicates that gift exchange indeed occurs between principals
and agents. In both treatments, higher effort levels are reciprocated with higher
wages.
8Since principals in the EWT have to pay the same wage to both agents, an interesting question
concerns how they choose this wage when confronted with a low and a high effort. To answer
this question, we assume that the wage-effort relation from IWT reflects the “true” wage-setting
preferences of principals because wage choices were not constrained in this treatment. We regress
wages on effort in the IWT and calculate predicted wages for all possible levels of effort. We
then calculate the differences between actual wages paid in EWT and these predicted wages. This
analysis shows that the actual wage in EWT is very close to the average between the predicted
wage for the higher and lower effort in IWT (the detailed analysis is available upon request). This
means that principals in the EWT weight the higher and lower effort about equally when deciding
on the wage payment.
33
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Effort
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 W
a
g
e
IWT
EWT
Figure 2.3: Average wage for a given effort.
Result 2: Principals reward higher effort levels with higher wages in
both treatments.
Reciprocal behavior of the principals generates monetary incentives for the
agents. In order to calculate the monetary incentives entailed in principals’ wage
decisions, one has to take into account agents’ cost of effort exertion (see Table 2.1).
Qualitatively, this does not change the picture of the effort-wage relation: higher
effort levels seem to lead not only to higher wages, but also to higher profits for the
agents. To check this in more detail, we estimate an OLS-model where we regress
the agent’s profit per period piAi on his effort level ei and a constant. To account for
potential differences between treatments we include a treatment dummy IWT , and
an interaction term of the treatment dummy and the agent’s effort. IWT equals
1 for the individual wage treatment and 0 for the equal wage treatment. Reported
robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering within matching groups. The
estimation results are shown in Column 1 of Table 2.3. The coefficients indicate
that the effort-profit relation is indeed positive in both treatments. On average,
an additional unit of effort increases the agent’s profit under equal wages by 1.031
points. This coefficient is weakly significant. In the individual wage treatment the
effort-profit relation is slightly steeper: an effort increase of 1 leads to an increase in
34
agent’s profit of 1.804 points (1.031 + 0.773). The difference between treatments,
however, is not significant.
Dep. Variable piAi piAi
ei 1.031* 0.854**
(0.535) (0.348)
IWT × ei 0.773 0.995*
(0.615) (0.469)
cons 5.927** -5.815***
(2.614) (1.523)
IWT -3.744 11.004***
(3.235) (3.274)
ej 2.774***
(0.280)
IWT × ej -3.178***
(0.403)
N. Obs. 576 576
R2 0.100 0.238
Table 2.3: Profit regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustered
matching groups and are given in parentheses. For each firm, one observation per
period is included in the analysis. The dummy “IWT” is equal to 1 for the individual
wage treatment. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and
***, respectively.
We also estimate a second model where we control for the co-worker’s effort
ej (see Column 2 of Table 2.3). The results indicate that the co-worker’s effort
choice has a substantial influence on an agent’s profit under wage equality while
it has a negligible influence if individual wages are paid. An increase in agent j’s
effort increases agent i’s profit in a given period by 2.774 points in the EWT, while
the (insignificant) influence in the IWT is −0.404 (= 2.774 − 3.178). However, it
is still individually profitable for the agents to exert high efforts in the EWT. An
additional unit of (own) effort increases the agent’s profit by 0.854 points.9 Our
9One could object that subjects in the experiment did not have access to the analyses we just
presented, because these are “ex-post” examinations while subjects only observed behavior and
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findings concerning agents’ monetary incentives can thus be summarized as follows.
Result 3: The wages paid by principals imply similar monetary incen-
tives in both treatments. A higher effort level leads to a higher profit in
both treatments.
2.3.3 The Importance of Equity
In light of the previous result, the strong differences in actual efforts and especially
the low effort levels under equal wages are remarkable and stress the significance of
non-pecuniary motivations for agents’ performance. Agents under equal wages pre-
dominantly choose low efforts, thereby foregoing considerable profits. Apparently,
equal wages are not reconcilable with agents’ horizontal fairness considerations.
On the other hand, agents under individual wages provide very high effort levels.
Thus, aggregated behavior is consistent with the predictions of equity-concerned
agents. We therefore focus our analysis of non-monetary motivations on the ques-
tion whether individual behavior is in line with a concern for the fulfillment of the
norm of equity.
Agents’ Reactions to Norm Violations
We first analyze how agents react to a violation of the norm of equity. Equity theory
argues that agents experience distress from inequity and take action to reduce it—
which in our setup means to increase or decrease the individual effort. The direction
of the effort adjustment should depend on the type of norm violation. An equity-
concerned agent who works more but does not receive a higher payoff than his
co-worker faces a disadvantageous norm violation. To restore equity, he can only
outcomes of their previous groups. We therefore calculate the profit-maximizing effort level for
each agent in each period based on the information this subject actually has. If we assume that
agents choose the effort level that was on average the most profitable of all effort levels they have
observed so far, the calculations show that agents in the EWT could have increased their efforts and
profits considerably even by using only their limited information. In the last period, the average
profit-maximizing effort level exceeds the average actual level in that period by 61%. By contrast,
the average actual effort levels of subjects in the IWT are very close to the profit-maximizing levels.
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Effort Down Effort Constant Effort Up N. Obs.
EWT
No Violation 19.1 % 54.4 % 26.5 % 68
Adv. Violation 12.2 % 43.5 % 44.3 % 230
Disadv. Violation 52.6 % 33.9 % 13.5 % 230
Total 30.7 % 40.7 % 28.6 % 528
IWT
No Violation 19.2 % 51.8 % 29.0 % 448
Adv. Violation 45.0 % 27.5 % 27.5 % 40
Disadv. Violation 35.0 % 57.5 % 7.5 % 40
Total 22.3 % 50.4 % 27.3 % 528
Table 2.4: Frequency of effort reactions.
decrease his effort. Analogously, his co-worker who exerts a lower effort and earns a
higher profit faces an advantageous norm violation and should increase his effort.10
Table 2.4 shows how often agents decrease, increase or do not change their effort
from period t to t + 1 after they experienced no, an advantageous or a disadvan-
tageous norm violation in period t. The top panel of Table 2.4 reports data for
the equal wage treatment. When the norm is fulfilled, most agents keep their effort
constant (54%) and slightly more agents increase their effort than decrease it. After
experiencing an advantageous norm violation, agents tend to increase their effort
(44%) and only few reduce it (12%). The opposite is true after a disadvantageous
norm violation: the majority of agents decrease their effort (53%) and only few
increase their effort in the following period (14%). In line with equity theory these
numbers suggest that agents change their effort provision in the direction that makes
a violation less likely to occur in the next period.
Behavior in the individual wage treatment (bottom panel) is very similar to
behavior in the EWT for the cases of no violation and disadvantageous violations.
10More precisely, an advantageous norm violation comprises all cases when efforts are equal but
profit is higher, or when effort is lower but profit is not. A disadvantageous norm violation occurs
if efforts are equal but profit is lower, or if effort is higher but profit is not.
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When the norm is not violated agents mostly keep their effort unchanged. After
a disadvantageous norm violation efforts are decreased rather than increased, as
in the EWT. The only difference between the treatments is observed when agents
experience an advantageous norm violation: agents in the IWT tend to decrease
their effort while the EWT agents tend to increase it in this case.11
The pattern of individual reactions to norm violations indicates that agents care
about equity; we therefore check next how often norm violations occur in the two
treatments. We expected to see more norm violations in the EWT than in the IWT,
because the equal wage institution forces principals to set wages that are not in line
with the norm of equity whenever agents exert different efforts. This is indeed what
we observe. While the norm is violated in 87% of all cases (460 out of 528) in the
EWT, the figure for the IWT is only 15% of all cases (80 out of 528). Thus, even if
individual reactions in a given situation are similar, agents in the EWT are far more
often exposed to norm violations than agents in the IWT. Principals in the IWT
seem to understand quite well that agents care about equity and use the possibility
to set different wages in a sophisticated way. If efforts differ, they reward the more
hard-working agent with a higher wage in 90% of these cases. If agents exert the
same effort, principals pay equal wages in 90% of the cases.
Result 4: Agents mostly react to disadvantageous violations of the norm
of equity by reducing their effort and by increasing it after an advanta-
geous norm violation. The norm of equity is far more often violated in
the equal wage treatment.
So far we have seen that agents’ reactions are largely in line with the hypotheses
of equity theory and that treatments differ with respect to the frequency of equity-
norm violations. Yet, this is not sufficient to explain the treatment effect, since a
11We checked the robustness of the reaction patterns in several ways. For example, it could be
that agents react differently to norm violations if they are paid very high or low absolute wages.
However, performing the analysis only for agents receiving a wage out of the top or bottom quartile
of the ex-post wage distribution does not alter the result. An implicit assumption of our analysis
is that the gift-exchange relation is generally intact between principal and agent, i.e., that agents
exert a non-minimal effort and that principals pay a positive wage. The results do not change if
one restricts the analysis to these cases. Also if one defines gift exchange as requiring the agent’s
profit to be positive, i.e. wi > c(ei) instead of wi > 0, the results are very similar.
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norm violation is always advantageous for one agent and at the same time disad-
vantageous for the other one. If both agents adjust their effort in a similar way but
in opposite directions the adjustments will cancel out. However, previous evidence
suggests that reactions to a disadvantageous norm violation are stronger than reac-
tions to an advantageous one (e.g., Loewenstein et al. 1989, Mowday 1991, Tho¨ni
and Ga¨chter 2008). If this is the case, norm violations could explain the downward
trend in the EWT and the treatment difference in effort provision.
Figure 2.4 shows the average magnitude of changes in effort provision from period
t to period t+1 after an agent experienced no norm violation, a disadvantageous or
an advantageous norm violation in period t. The width of the bars corresponds to
the number of observations in the respective category (cf. last column of Table 2.4).
When the equity-norm is not violated agents tend to keep their effort constant or
even slightly increase it. After a disadvantageous norm violation, agents in the EWT
react strongly. They decrease their effort by 1.30. Their co-worker, experiencing an
advantageous norm violation, increases his effort but not as strong. He raises his
effort by only 0.75. The difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon test of the
absolute values: p = 0.01). In the IWT, both groups of agents experiencing a norm
violation decrease their effort. The strength of reactions indicate that agents suffer
more from a disadvantageous norm violation than from an advantageous one. This
results in an overall decrease of efforts after a norm violation.
Result 5: Agents’ reactions to a violation of the norm of equity are
asymmetric: the negative reaction of the disadvantaged agents is stronger
than the reaction of the advantaged agents. This asymmetry in agents’
reactions results in an overall negative time trend in efforts for the EWT
and in the strong treatment difference in effort.
The analyses above suggests that agents care about equity and experience the
equal wage scheme as unfair. Interestingly, even the principals consider the equal
wage scheme as less fair. In the post-experimental questionnaire, principals were pre-
sented three hypothetical game situations that included effort choices, wage choices,
and the resulting payoffs for all players. They were asked whether they considered
the resulting allocation as just. One of the three situations reflected their own aver-
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Figure 2.4: Magnitude of effort reactions. The average change in effort from period
t to period t + 1 is shown given that the agent experienced no norm violation, an
advantageous violation or a disadvantageous norm violation in period t. The width
of the bars corresponds to the number of observations.
age behavior in the experiment.12 The principals did not know that they were facing
their own past decisions when answering the question. 63% of the principals in the
IWT considered their own decisions fair while only 38% of the principals in the
EWT shared this view (Mann-Whitney test on matching group shares: p = 0.03).
Simulation with Equity-Concerned Agents
We demonstrated above that horizontal fairness concerns shape agents’ behavior
under the two payment schemes. In combination with the frequent violations of
the norm of equity in the EWT we are able to explain the performance differences
across treatments. In order to further illustrate how institutions and equity-concerns
interact, we take our previous findings on agents’ period-to-period reactions and link
them to the aggregate dynamics in the experiment. We do so with a simulation in
which all agents are assumed to derive utility from money, but to also suffer whenever
the equity principle is not met. When deciding about their effort in a given period,
12This situation was constructed as follows: We calculated the average effort of the higher-effort
and of the lower-effort providers that the principals actually faced during the experiment. We
then took the average of the wages the principals paid to the two groups. Finally, we calculated
hypothetical payoffs for all three “average” players by considering the costs of the average efforts.
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the simulated agents compare their effort and profit in the previous period with the
effort and profit of their co-worker in that period. According to the comparison
along these two dimensions, four reactions can be distinguished for the simulated
agents. (i) For an agent who had a higher effort and a higher profit, the norm of
equity is fulfilled and the pecuniary comparison is also advantageous for him, so
he keeps his effort constant. (ii) For an agent who exerted a lower effort and got
a lower profit, the norm is satisfied but profit maximization is not, thus he partly
adjusts his effort in the direction of his co-worker’s effort, i.e., he chooses an effort
(ei,t + ej,t)/2. (iii) An agent with higher effort and lower profit feels distressed as
he suffers from a disadvantageous norm violation. He adjusts his effort fully and
chooses ei,t+1 = ej,t. (iv) Finally, for an agent with lower effort and higher profit the
norm violation is advantageous, thus the resulting utility is higher than in case (iii).
He chooses an effort (ei,t + ej,t)/2. The reactions in cases (i) to (iv) are in line with
the period-to-period reactions presented in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.4.
In the simulation, we use actual effort data from the experiment only for the
first period. The subsequent effort decisions are based on the simulated profits and
simulated efforts of the previous period. The simulated principals pay the average
wage for a given effort (IWT) or the average wage sum for a given effort sum (EWT)
as calculated from the experimental data. Profits are then calculated as wage minus
cost of effort exertion. We use the same matching protocol as in the experiment.
Figure 2.5 shows how effort choices evolve over time in the experimental data and
in the simulations. The simulations ‘EWT sim’ and ‘IWT sim’ trace the real data
very well and are able to reproduce the large effort difference between treatments.
In the individual wage simulation, efforts increase like the real efforts although the
slight downward trend in the second half of the experiment cannot be reproduced.
Efforts in the equal wage simulation constantly decrease down to an effort level
slightly above 3 in the final period. This pattern is very similar to the dynamics in
the real data.
Note that the pivotal agent is different between the simulated treatments: in the
equal wage simulation the norm of equity is violated when agents choose different
effort levels. In these cases, the agent with the higher effort will fully adjust his
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Figure 2.5: Simulated efforts of agents adopting to equity-norm violations.
effort in the direction of his co-worker’s effort while the co-worker will increase his
effort level only to the average effort of the last period. In the EWT simulation,
the average effort therefore converges to the lowest first period effort as agents are
subsequently re-matched: the low-effort providers are pivotal. By contrast, in the
IWT the high-effort providers have the decisive impact on the overall outcome. The
norm of equity is mostly fulfilled in the IWT. Thus, the agent with the higher effort
keeps his effort constant while his co-worker adjusts his effort. The average effort
therefore converges to the highest first period effort. We will analyze this point in
more detail in the next section.
Result 6: Simple simulations based on agents who have preferences for
money and equitable treatment are in line with the efforts observed in the
experiment and are able to reproduce the observed treatment effect.
2.3.4 Dynamics of High-Effort and Low-Effort Providers
As already seen in Figure 2.2, subjects exhibit a substantial degree of heterogeneity
with respect to effort provision. In the following, we analyze if the agents who are
most or least willing to exert effort are affected differently by the two payment modes
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at hand. A common informal argument claims that equal wages will be especially
detrimental to the motivation of high performers but clean empirical evidence is
scarce. Furthermore, it is unclear how weakly motivated agents react to equal or
individual wages. We also address the question whether high and low performers
impact the overall results differently in the two treatments. The simulations pre-
sented in the previous section suggest that this could indeed be the case: in the
EWT simulation, the low-effort providers are decisive for the final outcome while it
is the high-effort providers in the IWT simulation.
To analyze these questions in the experimental data we classify agents according
to their effort decision in the first period. We define the agent with the highest first-
period effort in each matching group as “high-effort provider” and the agent with the
lowest effort as “low-effort provider”. This type definition is chosen because when
agents decide on their effort in the first period, they do not have any information
about the behavior of other subjects and all learning and coordination processes
occur after this initial effort choice. Thus first-period effort is likely to be a good
proxy for the intrinsic willingness of a specific agent to exert effort. If some of the
subjects are intrinsically inclined to exert high efforts they should show up in the
group of high-effort providers. In contrast, if some of the subjects are intrinsically
inclined to exert low efforts they should show up in the group of low-effort providers.
In Figure 2.6 we follow the high-effort providers and low-effort providers in both
treatments and show their effort decisions over time. In the first period, the groups
of high-effort providers and the groups of low-effort providers are close together
across treatments.13 This changes completely over the course of the 12 periods. In
the individual wage treatment, high-effort providers continue to provide high effort
levels. Low-effort providers increase their efforts dramatically up to the level of
the high-effort providers and even higher in the last periods. In the equal wage
treatment, the dynamics are reversed. Here, the low-effort providers keep their
13In the first period, effort levels are not significantly different between treatments for high-effort
providers (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.14) while they are close together but different for the low-
effort providers (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.03). Within treatments, the high-effort and low-effort
providers choose statistically different effort levels in the first period (Wilcoxon signed rank test:
p = 0.01 (IWT), p = 0.01 (EWT)).
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Figure 2.6: Effort decisions of high-effort and low-effort providers. In each match-
ing group, the agent with the highest (lowest) effort in the first period is defined as
the high (low)-effort provider.
effort provision constant and the high-effort providers reduce their efforts to the
level of the low-effort providers. In the last six periods, effort levels are not different
within treatments (Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = 0.67 (IWT), p = 0.78 (EWT))
while they differ between treatments (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01 (high-effort
providers), p < 0.01 (low-effort providers)). Put simply, the “good” agents push the
“bad” agents up under individual wages while under equal wages the “bad” ones
pull the “good” ones down.
These dynamics underline the importance of the different non-monetary motives
induced by the two wage setting institutions. Remember that agents face similar
monetary incentives in both treatments, but wage equality often violates the norm
of equity. Agents in this treatment who are in principle willing to exert high levels
of effort get frustrated and lower their efforts. On the contrary, under individual
wages where the norm of equity is intact, good performance spreads. These results
suggest that choosing a wage scheme also influences the social dynamics between the
agents. In our experiment, individual wages lead to positive dynamics since agents
orientate themselves by the most hard-working agents. In contrast, the equal wage
scheme focuses agents’ attention on the least motivated agents.
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Result 7: The pivotal agent is different between treatments: in the IWT,
agents who initially provide low effort align with the high-effort providers
over time. In the EWT, agents who initially provide high effort align
with the low-effort providers over time.
2.3.5 The Role of Intentions
So far, we interpret our results as supporting the notion that subjects care about the
norm of equity. However, by design our treatments necessarily differ in the number
of instruments that a principal has at hand. In the EWT, principals only choose a
single wage—whereas principals in the IWT decide on two wages and consequently
can tailor reactions individually to agents’ preceding choices. Therefore, agents
might attribute a different degree of intentionality to principals’ decisions: In the
EWT, the role of intentions is limited to the level of the wage. The IWT contains an
additional element of intentionality because principals also decide on relative wages
and consequently whether the equity norm is fulfilled or violated. In light of the
literature that stresses the behavioral importance of intentions in situations of re-
ciprocal interaction (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk et al. 2005), there
is thus a potential alternative explanation for our treatment effect. In other words,
one might speculate that the difference is not caused by the different frequency of
norm fulfillment per se, but rather by the additional element of intentionality.14
To test this alternative explanation, we conducted an additional control treat-
ment (wage level treatment or WLT) that clearly isolates the effect of norm fulfill-
ment on agents’ effort choices. As in the EWT, principals in the WLT only choose a
single wage. The other agents’ wage is then exogenously set by a computer program
such that the equity norm is always fulfilled, i.e., agents who exerted a higher effort
than their co-worker automatically receive a higher payoff. Importantly, this implies
that the fulfillment of the equity norm is not attributable to principals’ decisions.
Except for this change of the wage-setting institution, the instructions and the ex-
perimental design were identical to the previous treatments. The 72 subjects who
participated in the four additional sessions had not previously taken part in the
14We thank Patrick Bolton and an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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IWT or the EWT.
The specific equity norm implemented in the WLT experiments dictates pro-
portionality between agents’ monetary payoffs and efforts. We chose this “equity
formula” as it is probably the most prominent formulation of the equity principle
(see Section 2.2.2). Given a principal’s decision for the low-effort agent, the wage
for the high-performing agent is exogenously fixed such that both agents receive the
same payoff per unit of effort provided, i.e., pilow
elow
=
pihigh
ehigh
holds. For example, if the
principal observes efforts of 2 and 6 and sets the wage for the low-effort provider
to be 5, the payoff of this agent is 5 − c(2) = 4 (compare Table 1). Following the
equity formula, the payoff of the high-effort provider will then automatically be set
to 4
2
· 6 = 12; which implies a wage of 20 after taking the cost of providing 6 units
of effort into account.15
The wage-setting institution in the WLT is not meant to be an analog of insti-
tutions found in actual labor markets, as it is the case for the IWT and the EWT.
It exogenously implements the incentive structure that is endogenously created by
principals in the IWT.16 If we observe similar efforts in the WLT as in the IWT we
can rule out intentions as an explanation for the difference between our two main
treatments, IWT and EWT.
Figure 2.7 compares agents’ mean effort choices over time for all three treatments.
As can be seen, the exogenous implementation of the equity norm suffices to elicit
high efforts from the agents. The average effort difference between the WLT and the
15The equity formula leads to counterintuitive implications whenever negative values for the
inputs or outcomes are possible. Therefore, if in our experiment the efforts differ and the principal’s
choice of wlow implies pilow ≤ 0, the other agent’s wage is instead set such that pihigh = pilow+5. This
guarantees that a norm of equity is fulfilled for all possible wage-effort combinations. Nevertheless,
the high-effort agent still faces the risk of making losses whenever the low-effort agent gets a
negative payoff.
16As shown in Result 3, the monetary incentives in the IWT imply that profit-maximizing
agents should provide non-minimal effort levels. As a consequence of exogenously implementing
these implicit incentives in the WLT, new subgame-perfect Nash equilibria necessarily arise. Our
focus of interest, however, rests on the comparison of the observed behavior across treatments
rather than on comparing behavior to the game-theoretical equilibrium predictions. For a similar
approach of “exogenizing” endogenous incentives to test for the impact of intentions, compare for
example Blount (1995), Charness (2004), or Cox (2004).
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Figure 2.7: Average effort per treatment.
IWT of only 0.36 is insignificant (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.83). Compared to the
EWT, efforts are on average 3.44 units higher in the wage-level treatment (Mann-
Whitney test: p < 0.01). As in the IWT, efforts do not decrease over time in the
WLT (Wilcoxon test for periods 1–6 against 7–12: p = 0.44). Also the distribution
of efforts in the WLT closely resembles the one in the IWT. Under both treatments,
the modal choice is the provision of maximum effort. In the WLT, an effort level of
10 is chosen in 46.5% of all cases, compared to 49% in the IWT.
Result 8: The wage level treatment shows that the treatment difference
between the IWT and the EWT is not caused by the fact that principals
can set two wages instead of one per se. Differences in equity norm
fulfillment—independent of intentionality—are the driving force behind
agents’ performance.
Taken together, the results from the additional control treatment corroborate our
previous findings. They suggest that the observed performance differences are not
driven by the differing degree of intentionality across treatments. This, of course,
does not imply that intentions are unimportant in general; however in our setup,
treatment differences are almost exclusively caused by equity considerations.
47
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we studied the interaction of gift exchange with different payment
modes; more specifically, we analyzed how horizontal fairness concerns of employees
affect the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In our
experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The principal pays equal
wages in one treatment and can set individual wages in the other. The use of equal
wages elicits substantially lower efforts and efficiency in spite of similar monetary
incentives: exerting high effort pays off under both wage schemes. The strong
treatment difference is driven by subjects’ preferences for horizontal equity and the
fact that the equity principle is frequently violated in the equal wage treatment.
This is not the case in the individual wage treatment, as principals set wages almost
always in line with the norm of equity. The results of a control treatment show
that indeed norm fulfillment per se and not different degrees of intentionality are
the driving force behind agents’ behavior.
Our results have a number of implications, both for the advancement of exist-
ing theories and for the design of wage schemes in practice. First of all, while it
is well-known that equal wages can distort monetary incentives, in our experiment
they are efficiency decreasing even though individuals’ monetary incentives are qual-
itatively not affected. Rather, equal wages oftentimes lead to situations which are
considered as unfair by the workforce. This holds in particular because agents are
heterogeneous and equal wages violate the equity principle whenever workers differ
in their performance. It may thus be oversimplifying to argue that equal wages lead
to less envy and therefore higher work morale, as it is frequently done in the political
discussion.
In this regard, it is doubtful whether strict wage equality can be reconciled with
the use of reciprocal gift exchange to enforce incomplete contracts. Our findings
suggest that adherence to the norm of equity is a necessary prerequisite for a success-
ful gift-exchange relation. Consequently, the wage setting institution must provide
principals with means to account for possible differences in agents’ behavior, e.g.,
to individually reward agents who outperform their co-workers. The performance of
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agents in the individual wage treatment and in the wage level treatment shows how
effective gift exchange can be, as long as horizontal equity concerns are respected:
although explicit contract enforcement is absent, 80% of the possible efficiency gains
are realized.
In practice, the discretion to fulfill the norm of equity does not have to be in
monetary terms. Perks and non-monetary benefits like extra vacation or awards can
be useful devices to motivate workers in this context. These instruments become
especially important when it is not possible to wage discriminate on a given hierar-
chical level, e.g., because the firm’s internal pay structure, agreements with a union
or legistlation dictate wage equality.
The results in this chapter should not be interpreted as arguments against wage
equality in general. They rather suggest that equal wages come at a cost that has
to be weighed against their potential benefits. For example, equal wages are easier
to implement than individual wages, and they may encourage peer monitoring and
collaboration. The relative importance of these costs and benefits (and also the
impact of the workforce’s social preferences more generally) is likely to depend on
the details of the institutional setting. These include the production technology, the
information structure, and the organizational design of the firm. In this chapter we
presented results for one such setting. Our design provides a simple and parsimo-
nious framework that can successively be enriched to study these aspects in future
research.
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Chapter 3
Contract Enforcement and
Involuntary Unemployment
3.1 Introduction
Many labor relationships are characterized by contractual incompleteness, in par-
ticular since employment contracts often specify employees’ obligations only im-
precisely. Probably the most important reason for leaving contracts incomplete is
the difficulty to monitor and verify employee performance or work effort. When
this is the case, firms cannot stipulate fully contingent contracts but have to rely
on other, implicit means to elicit work effort. Several such implicit contract en-
forcement mechanisms have been discussed in the literature, ranging from voluntary
bonus payments to self-enforcing, relational contracts based on an implicit threat
to dismiss workers who have been caught shirking (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson
1989, Baker et al. 1992, MacLeod and Malcomson 1998). Other papers have argued
that social preferences could help to overcome moral hazard problems. Workers
who feel treated fairly, e.g., because their employer generously shares the rents from
production, might voluntarily provide high work effort in return (Akerlof 1982, Fehr
et al. 1993).
While implicit contracts can provide strong performance incentives, they can
have detrimental consequences for the labor market as a whole. In particular, im-
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plicit contracting can give rise to involuntary unemployment. For instance, when
fairness concerns are important, it can be optimal for firms to dismiss workers rather
than cut wages in times of economic downturns (Bewley 1999). More generally, firms
might ration jobs because the requirement to pay fair wages could render less pro-
ductive jobs unprofitable. Finally, the presence of unemployed workers could itself
be a prerequisite to elicit effort of those employed. Higher unemployment levels
increase the cost of job losses since, c.p., the job acquisition rate for unemployed
workers decreases. Thus, unemployment might be necessary to provide sufficient
performance incentives for employed workers who want to avoid losing their jobs
(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989).
In this chapter, we empirically analyze the relationship between contract en-
forcement and the emergence of unemployment. We address the following questions:
Does the absence of third party contract enforcement have a direct impact on the
level of involuntary unemployment? Is this influence due to the implicit contract
enforcement instruments used by firms? In particular, do firms ration jobs when ef-
fort is not verifiable although full employment would be (technologically) efficient?
Do they engage in repeated, long-term employment relationships and do they pay
“fair” wages? How does unemployment influence workers’ effort provision?
We study these questions in an experimental labor market where we exogenously
vary the verifiability of work effort. In the market, firms and workers interact
during multiple market periods. All firms share the same production technology,
which exhibits decreasing returns to scale from labor, but ensures that full em-
ployment is technologically efficient. In each market period, firms can hire up to
two workers whereas workers can accept exactly one contract offer. We concentrate
on simple, but frequently observed employment contracts which stipulate a fixed,
non-contingent wage payment and a desired level of work effort. In order to study
rent-sharing as well as the determinants of dismissal or re-employment in relational
contracts, we allow firms and workers to interact repeatedly and build up long-term
work relationships.
Our two treatment conditions only differ in the degree to which work effort is
verifiable and, hence, explicitly enforceable. In a control treatment, concluded con-
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tracts are explicitly enforced, i.e., a worker’s effort has to be equal to the contrac-
tually agreed upon effort level (C treatment). By contrast, in our main treatment
(IC treatment) effort is observable to firms and workers, but not verifiable. Firms
therefore have to rely on implicit contracts. Backward induction together with the
assumptions of standard neoclassical labor market models predict that treatments
will differ in terms of workers’ performance (i.e., first best work effort will be elicited
in the C treatment, whereas effort will be minimal in the IC treatment), but that
maximum employment will be achieved in both treatments.
However, when workers’ performance depends on whether they feel treated fairly
by their employer (i.e., when workers have social preferences), firms in the IC treat-
ment might find it profitable to ration jobs, rely on repeated interaction with specific
workers, and pay strictly positive rents to those workers. This could lead to market
outcomes where firms succeed in eliciting above minimum effort levels also in the
IC treatment. However, this efficiency increase in terms of effort might come at the
cost of involuntary unemployment. High wage payments and job rationing in the IC
treatment could lead to higher unemployment as compared to the treatment with
explicit contract enforcement.
Our experiment yields the following findings. First, unemployment is indeed
much higher when third party contract enforcement is not feasible. More impor-
tantly, unemployment in this treatment is involuntary, being caused by the firms’
employment and contracting policy. Most firms indeed pay high wages but offer
fewer vacancies than possible. By contrast, wages are close to the market clearing
level when effort is explicitly enforced. Firms do not ration jobs, and unemployment
is very low. Moreover, unemployment in this treatment is mostly voluntary, being
caused by workers who do not accept existing contract offers.
The firms’ employment policy in the IC treatment, however, succeeds in eliciting
high efforts from the employed workers: more than 50% of workers choose effort
levels close to the maximum and only 12% of workers shirk and provide minimum
work effort. We observe that many firms employ a specific worker over several
periods when effort is not explicitly enforced. These long-term work relationships
are characterized by high wages and high effort levels. Providing high efforts in
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response to high wages is profitable for the worker since firms do not rehire workers
who were caught shirking in previous periods. At the same time, being unemployed
entails considerable costs for workers. Due to firms’ job rationing, the prevalence of
long-term work relationship, and the high level of unemployment, the job acquisition
rate for unemployed workers is very low.
The IC treatment also allows us to deeper analyze the determinants of firms’
success in an environment where contracts are not explicitly enforceable. Interest-
ingly, profits are initially higher for firms who ration jobs, but do not depend on
firm size in later periods of the IC treatment. As more and more firms decide to
ration jobs, unemployment rises, and therefore the pressure to perform increases for
employed workers. Ultimately, work effort (and therefore firm profits) also increases
in firms that employ more than one worker. However, we find that employment rela-
tionships in these firms differ strongly from the ones in successful one-worker firms.
While one-worker firms are characterized by long-term employment relationships,
high wages and high worker rents, the successful two-worker firms offer low wages
and positive, but lower rents to the workers. Moreover, fluctuation in two-worker
firms is much higher. The result resembles an “endogenously segmented” labor mar-
ket with two forms of employment relationships which are equally successful from
the firms’ perspective but differ strongly for workers.
Efficiency wage theories have long postulated that the absence of explicit con-
tract enforcement could lead to involuntary unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Akerlof and Yellen 1990). To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first who empirically show a direct, causal link between con-
tract enforcement and the emergence of unemployment. So far, there has been only
indirect evidence which suggested that this link might exist. For instance, it has
been shown in surveys as well as in economic experiments that fairness concerns in
environments characterized by contractual incompleteness can be the cause of wage
rigidities (Campbell III and Kamlani 1997, Bewley 1999, Fehr and Falk 1999). In
a setup similar to ours, Brown et al. (2004) have shown that the absence of third
party contract enforcement leads to a “bilateralization” of trade, where interaction
between firms and workers is characterized by long-term employment relationships
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with high wages and high effort. Unemployment, however, was exogenously given
in their experiments and firms had no option to ration jobs.
The paper most closely related to this chapter is the work by Fehr et al. (1996)
who also study the emergence of unemployment in a market where effort is not
perfectly verifiable. However, their experimental design differs from ours in a variety
of important aspects. First, they concentrate on one-shot interactions between firms
and workers while our focus is on the emergence of unemployment through fairness
concerns and relational contracting. Second, as a shortcut for implementing a threat
of dismissal, Fehr et al. (1996) introduce an exogenously given, strictly positive
probability that workers who shirk will be caught and have to pay a penalty to their
firm. In contrast, we can directly observe dismissal and re-employment decisions by
firms. Finally, workers’ productivity in their experiment was private knowledge to
firms and productivity in some firms was so low that these firms could not profitably
offer incentive compatible contracts. In our setup, we observe job rationing although
it is always possible for firms to offer an incentive compatible contract that yields
positive profits.
Complementary evidence to our results that also suggests the importance of
efficiency wages comes from the literature on non-compensating intra- and inter-
industry wage differentials (e.g., Krueger and Summers 1988, Blanchflower et al.
1996, Abowd et al. 1999, Goux and Maurin 1999). The earlier papers in this lit-
erature have observed persistent interindustry heterogeneity in wages for workers
with identical observable characteristics. This rejects classical competitive theories
of wage determination. More recently, Abowd et al. (1999) and Goux and Mau-
rin (1999) have found that unobserved worker heterogeneity explains a considerable
fraction of interindustry wage differentials. However, strong interfirm wage differ-
entials within a given industry persist.
The results reported in Goux and Maurin (1999) indicate that wages strongly
increase in firm size and firms’ capital intensity and, to a lower extent, in productivity
or profitability. Our results for the IC treatment show that higher wages are paid by
firms who ration jobs and employ only one worker. This is, however, only seemingly
contradictory. According to Goux and Maurin (1999), it is likely that larger firms
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in their sample face more difficulties to monitor employee performance. Therefore,
their findings are in line both with efficiency wage theories and with our results.
Comparison of wages across our treatment conditions strongly suggests that it is
indeed the difference in the verifiability of effort and not firm size per se that matters
for differences in wages. Holding contract enforcement constant—i.e., comparing
wages within the IC treatment—it is the more productive and, under decreasing
returns to scale, smaller firms that pay higher wages.
Our finding of an endogenous segmentation of the labor market in the IC treat-
ment also provides interesting new insights into the debate on dual labor markets.
It has long been acknowledged that dual labor markets can be an implication of con-
tract enforcement problems and efficiency wages. However, in these models, dual
labor markets typically arise as a consequence of differences in monitoring costs
across firms (Bulow and Summers 1986) or due to differences in adjustment costs
to demand fluctuations (Saint-Paul 1996, ch. 4). In our experiment, segmentation
occurs in the IC treatment even though all firms face the same technological con-
straints. Rather, segmentation is the result of market interactions when third party
contract enforcement is not feasible. In response to the non-verifiability of effort,
many firms ration jobs, pay high wages and employ specific workers over a long time
horizon. As a result, unemployment increases. This allows other firms to successfully
employ a “secondary-sector” contracting strategy, involving lower wage payments
and tighter conditions for contract renewal. High unemployment disproportionally
helps these firms, since they are more likely to hire previously unemployed workers.
For a given wage, these workers tend to shirk particularly little—unlike in classical
shirking models where unemployment disciplines all workers similarly. The “sec-
ondary sector” firms are therefore able to pay lower wages to elicit a certain level of
work effort.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the following section de-
scribes our experimental setup. Section 3.3 derives behavioral predictions and Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
To study the impact of contractual incompleteness on unemployment, we imple-
mented an experimental labor market where we exogenously varied the verifiability
of work effort. In the market, firms and workers interacted during 18 market pe-
riods. Each of the 18 periods consisted of two stages: a market phase where firms
offered employment contracts and hired workers, and a work phase where work ef-
fort of employed workers was determined. The experimental treatments differed
only in the degree to which work effort in the second phase was third party enforce-
able. In our main treatment, henceforth called Incomplete Contracts Treatment (or
IC treatment), third party contract enforcement was not feasible and workers thus
could depart from the contractually agreed upon effort level. By contrast, the effort
level stipulated in the employment contract was explicitly enforced in our control
treatment, henceforth called Complete Contracts Treatment (or C treatment).
3.2.1 The Market Phase
Firms were the contract makers in the market phase. When offering a contract,
firms stipulated a non-contingent wage payment w and a desired level of effort eˆ. To
study the relevance of long-term employment relations under the different treatment
conditions, firms could make two different types of contract offers: public offers
which were available to all workers and could also be observed by all other firms,
or private contract offers that were only available to one specific worker. The latter
type of contract offers allowed firms to rehire certain workers and interact repeatedly
with them. To enable the formation of long-term relations, in the beginning of the
experiment each worker and each firm received an identification number (ID) which
was held constant throughout the whole experimental session. If an employer wanted
to (re)hire a specific worker via a private contract offer, she had to specify the ID of
the worker in addition to the wage and desired effort level when entering the contract
offer. In this case, only the selected worker was informed about the contract offer,
and only this worker could accept the offer.
In a certain market period, each employer could hire up to two workers. As long
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as none of her contract offers had been accepted in a given period, an employer could
make as many private and public offers as she wanted. A worker could accept all
contract offers available to him, i.e., all public offers that were not yet accepted and
private offers that firms had addressed to him. Once a worker accepted a contract
offer, the contract between this worker and the respective firm was concluded. After
agreeing on one contract, the worker was not allowed to accept further contract
offers in this period. Additionally, all other outstanding offers of the respective
employer were removed from the list of available contracts in the moment where
one of her contract offers was accepted. The employer could then decide to hire a
second worker by entering new contract offers. This market feature was implemented
to prevent that an employer who wanted to employ only one worker but entered
multiple contract offers had two offers accepted before being able to withdraw her
remaining contract offers.
The market phase ended when the maximum number of contracts had been
concluded or when all firms had indicated that they did not want to make additional
contract offers.1 At the end of the market period, the worker(s) of a given firm were
informed about the contracts concluded by their firm, i.e., each worker received a
summary of his own contract terms as well as information on whether and under
which conditions his firm had employed a second worker. Providing information on
the size of the firm in which a worker is employed can be crucial for workers when
contracts are not third party enforceable. If some workers base their work effort on
the extent to which their firm shares production rents, e.g., because they respond
to “fair” wage payments, knowledge of offered rents, productivity, and firm size is
of high importance for workers (see Section 3.2.3 and Section 3.3).
1We also implemented a maximum trading time of 200 seconds for each market phase. This
constraint was, however, only binding in few occasions (mostly in the C treatment). The impact
of the time constraint on the level of unemployment and other market outcomes reported below
is therefore limited and confined to the control treatment with explicit contract enforcement (see
Section 3.4.1).
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3.2.2 The Work Phase
After the end of the market phase, the employed workers entered the second stage of
a market period—the work phase. In this stage, actual work effort e was determined.
Since effort was contractible in the complete contracts treatment, workers who had
accepted a contract offer in this treatment had to comply with the contract terms.
The desired effort level eˆ stipulated in their contract was thus explicitly enforced, i.e.,
e = eˆ was exogenously implemented by the experimenter. By contrast, work effort
was observable, but not verifiable in our main treatment. Therefore, a worker in the
IC treatment could choose any feasible level of effort in the work phase, i.e., he could
also exert less or more effort than stipulated in his employment contract. Workers’
effort choices, together with firms’ wage payments, determined material payoffs of
firms and workers. Before the next period started, a firm and its worker(s) were
informed about actual work efforts and the resulting payoffs for the firm and the
workers employed by this firm.
3.2.3 Parameters and Procedures
The participants’ roles were randomly assigned at the beginning of the experiment
and kept constant throughout all market periods. In every market, we had 17
workers and 7 firms. Since firms could employ at most two workers, this implies
that three workers were “exogenously” unemployed in each period (see Section 3.3).
A worker’s material payoff piW was given by
piW =
{
w − c(e) if worker accepted a contract [w, eˆ]
0 if unemployed
A worker who remained unemployed in a given period received a payoff of 0 points.
An employed worker received the wage w specified in his contract and had to bear
the cost of the work effort he provided, c(e). The set of feasible efforts and wages
was given by e ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10} and w ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 100}. Effort costs c(e) increased
convexly in the level of actual work effort (see Table 3.1).
A firm’s material payoff depended on the number of workers hired, the wage(s)
paid, and the effort exerted by the worker(s). Firms’ production technology was
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Effort level e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost of effort c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table 3.1: Schedule of effort costs.
characterized by decreasing returns to scale. Specifically, each unit of effort by a
worker increased production (and the firm’s payoff) by 10 points if only one worker
was employed by the firm. If two workers were employed, each unit of effort increased
the firm’s payoff by 7 points. Additionally, firms had to pay the wages specified in
their contracts. The material payoff of a firm, piF , can therefore be summarized as
follows:
piF =

10e1 − w1 if one worker employed
7(e1 + e2)− w1 − w2 if two workers employed
0 else
e1 (e2) denotes the effort provided by the first (second) worker, and w1 (w2) is
the wage paid to the first (second) worker employed by the firm. Note that this
specification of the production technology implies that efficiency is maximized when
two workers are employed and maximum effort is exerted: the second worker’s
marginal productivity per unit of effort is 4 whereas the marginal cost of effort lies
between 1 and 3 points. Payoff functions piF and piW , workers’ cost schedule c(e) as
well as the number of firms and workers in the market were common knowledge.
The experiment was carried out between June and November 2007 at the Bonn-
EconLab, the laboratory for economic experiments at the University of Bonn. We
conducted five sessions each for the IC treatment and the C treatment. A total of
240 subjects, mainly undergraduate university students from all majors, took part
in the experiments. Every subject participated only in one treatment condition. At
the beginning of an experimental session, participants received detailed information
about the rules and structure of the experiment.2 The experiment started only af-
2Instructions can be found in Appendix C.4. In order to prevent that participants’ experience
with fairness norms and long-term relationships from labor relations outside the laboratory play a
prominent role, instructions were framed in a neutral goods-market language.
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ter all participants had answered several control questions correctly. In addition,
subjects played one trial period of the market phase to ensure that they understood
how to use the computer program. Sessions lasted about 110 minutes and subjects
earned on average 25.49 Euro (about 35 USD at the time of the experiment), includ-
ing a showup fee of 8 Euro. The experiments were computerized using the software
“z-Tree” (Fischbacher 2007); subjects were recruited using the online recruitment
system by Greiner (2003).
3.3 Behavioral Predictions
3.3.1 Money-Maximizing Behavior of all Players
As indicated in Section 3.2, efficiency is maximized when all firms employ two work-
ers and all workers exert full effort. If players are rational and selfish, and if effort
is contractible (C treatment), we should expect that profit-maximizing firms imple-
ment the first best outcome and reap all gains from trade: in each period, firms will
employ two workers, offering contracts which ask for maximum effort (eˆ = e = 10)
and pay the minimum acceptable wage. As unemployed workers receive zero un-
employment benefits, this wage is equal to the cost of the implemented effort, i.e.,
w = c(10) = 18 points. Since there are 7 firms and 17 workers in each market, three
workers will remain unemployed by design of the experiment. As we are interested
in unemployment which is arising endogenously through the market interaction be-
tween firms and workers, we will refer to the situation where the maximum number
of workers is employed and only three workers remain “exogenously” unemployed
as full employment in what follows.
Which market outcomes should we expect in the IC treatment under the as-
sumptions of standard neoclassical labor market models, i.e., rationality, money-
maximizing behavior of all players and common knowledge thereof? All players
know that the market operates for exactly 18 periods—our setup thus constitutes
a repeated game of finite length which is solvable by backward induction. Since
effort is costly, but not verifiable, workers will choose the minimum effort e = 1
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in the final period of the IC treatment, irrespective of the wage and desired effort
level stipulated in their contract. Anticipating this, money-maximizing firms will
pay the minimum acceptable wage for an effort of 1 in this period. This amounts
to a wage payment w = c(1) = 0 since, again, workers’ outside option is to remain
unemployed and receive zero payoff.3 Through backward induction, the outcome of
minimal effort (and minimal wage) will also hold in all pre-final periods of the IC
treatment.
In sum, predictions differ strongly in terms of contracts offered and effort im-
plemented in the two different market environments. Lower efforts in the IC treat-
ment directly translate into lower market efficiency in this treatment. Importantly,
however, the two treatments should not differ in the second dimension of mar-
ket efficiency—the level of unemployment. In particular, under the assumption of
money-maximizing behavior of all players we should expect full employment also if
contracts are not third party enforceable. To see this, note that—given our assump-
tions on production technology and payoff functions—it is more profitable for a firm
to employ two workers at the minimum possible wage (w = 0) who exert minimum
effort (e = 1) compared to employing just one worker at the same wage rate who
exerts the same level of effort.
3.3.2 Fair-Minded Workers
There is mounting evidence both from laboratory (e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000,
Brown et al. 2004) and field studies (e.g., Bewley 1999, Cohn et al. 2008) which
suggests that workers’ performance in markets characterized by contractual incom-
pleteness depends on whether they feel treated fairly by their employer (see also
Akerlof 1982 and Akerlof and Yellen 1990 for an early theoretical assessment on
how fairness preferences can impact labor market outcomes). In this Section, we
will sketch how workers’ fairness preferences could influence the results of our ex-
periment. In particular, we will argue that the presence of fair-minded workers can
lead to market outcomes where higher efforts are observed in the IC treatment, but
3Assuming that workers reject contract offers with net payoffs equal to their outside option
yields [w, eˆ] = [1, 1] in IC and [w, eˆ] = [19, 10] in C.
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where the level of unemployment is also higher compared to the subgame perfect
equilibrium outlined in the previous paragraph.
Brown et al. (2004) have shown that the presence of fair-minded players in mar-
kets similar to our IC treatment gives firms incentives to build up long-term employ-
ment relationships and pay high wages to their workers. Workers in such long-term
relations will adhere to the contract and provide non-minimal levels of work effort
in most periods of the game. This outcome is profitable both for firms and work-
ers: if there are sufficiently many fair-minded workers, it is profitable for firms to
pay strictly positive rents even in the final period of the game, since fair workers
reciprocate high wages by providing high efforts. If firms in addition re-employ only
workers who adhere to the terms of the contract in pre-final periods (i.e., if firms
use a policy of contingent contract renewal), all workers have an incentive to fulfill
their contractually specified obligations in pre-final periods. Fair workers are will-
ing to provide high levels of effort as long as the wage payment is considered fair.
Selfish workers imitate fair workers because, by doing so, they have the chance to
be re-employed and earn positive rents also in future periods.
In Appendix C.3 we show that similar, cooperative outcomes can be achieved
in our IC treatment. However, they can involve above-minimal and involuntary
unemployment. More specifically, if fair-minded workers have “strictly egalitarian”
fairness preferences,4 the fraction of fair-minded workers necessary to sustain coop-
eration in two-worker firms is higher than for firms which employ only one worker.
Moreover, even if there are enough fair-minded workers, firms in our setup strictly
prefer to employ only one worker when fairness requires that net surplus has to be
shared equally between all members of a firm. The reason for the latter effect is
the implemented production technology. Because of decreasing returns to scale, the
second worker’s marginal contribution to total surplus is relatively low. If workers’
fairness concerns require the firm to share total surplus equally between the firm and
all hired workers, it could be that employing two workers with fair contracts yields
4I.e., Workers employed in a one-worker firm expect the gains from trade to be shared equally
between their firm and themselves, and workers employed in a two-worker firm expect that they
receive one third of the (net) surplus.
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lower total profits to the firm as compared to the situation where the firm employs
only one worker with the corresponding rent-sharing contract. For the parameters
specified in Section 3.2.3, this is the case (the derivation can be found in Appendix
C.3). Employing only one worker and sharing rents equally with this worker is thus
a dominant strategy for firms when the fraction of fair workers is high enough to
sustain cooperation in one-worker firms. In this situation, firms in the IC treatment
will ration jobs but pay high wages and succeed in eliciting above-minimal levels of
effort. This, however, gives rise to involuntary unemployment.
Obviously, the relative profitability of employing one or two workers strongly de-
pends on the wage payment necessary to induce work effort by fair-minded workers.
Therefore, it is crucial for market outcomes what these workers consider to be a fair
wage. So far we have assumed that fair-minded workers fulfill a contract if it offers
strictly egalitarian rent-sharing between all members of a firm. This assumption is
crucial for making job rationing profitable for firms. While the egalitarian fairness
benchmark has received a lot of support in the literature (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt
1999, Fehr et al. 2007) and is also intuitively appealing for our setup, it is by no
means obvious that it is the only plausible formulation of what constitutes fairness
(see Konow 2003 for an overview of different fairness principles).
For instance, it is also possible that a fair-minded worker in a two-worker firm re-
quires only that the surplus generated by himself is shared equally between the firm
and him. This form of “relation-specific egalitarianism”, where workers neglect the
surplus produced by other workers, is consistent with evidence from multi-worker
gift-exchange games. In experiments studying such games, it has been observed
that some workers seem to care relatively little about the payoffs of co-workers and
about the firm’s payoff resulting from its interaction with these co-workers (see, e.g.,
Maximiano et al. 2007, Charness and Kuhn 2007). Under this weaker fairness bench-
mark, employing two workers is c.p. more profitable for firms since they can reap
50% of total surplus (instead of 33% under the strictly egalitarian fairness bench-
mark). Indeed, assuming the weaker fairness benchmark for the parameters specified
in Section 3.2.3 changes the predictions for the IC treatment: if the fraction of fair-
minded workers is high enough, employing two workers under “relation-specific”
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surplus sharing is more profitable for firms than rationing jobs and sharing surplus
only with one worker (see Appendix C.3).
Which fairness benchmark describes workers’ actual fairness preferences best is
ultimately an empirical question. It is also possible that what constitutes a fair
wage from a worker’s perspective is itself influenced by market conditions. For
instance, the prevailing unemployment level could influence workers’ perception of
what constitutes a fair wage. Akerlof (1982)’s efficiency wage model assumes such a
negative relationship between the fair wage and the level of unemployment. Burks
et al. (2007) have recently provided survey evidence supporting the view that labor
market conditions might affect workers’ fairness perceptions. If this is the case,
we should expect that workers’ willingness to provide effort for a given wage (and,
therefore, also firms’ profits) will depend on the rate of unemployment.
In the following section, we test the behavioral predictions with our experimental
data. We first analyze whether the absence of third party contract enforcement in
the IC treatment indeed gives rise to unemployment (Section 3.4.1). We then study
market outcomes and behavior in the IC treatment in more detail. We investigate
determinants of firms’ hiring decisions and compare different contracting policies
used by firms. Finally, we analyze how workers’ behavior is influenced by market
conditions.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Unemployment
Our main interest concerns the level of unemployment, dependent on the degree to
which firms can explicitly enforce workers’ performance. Figure 3.1 depicts the level
of “endogenous unemployment”5 in the two treatments. Initially, unemployment
5Remember that, in both treatments, 3 workers were unemployed “by design” in every session
and every period due to excess supply of labor. To measure “endogenous unemployment” we
therefore calculate the total number of unemployed workers minus 3 and divide by the number
of possible jobs (given that each of 7 firms could offer 2 vacancies in every period the number of
possible jobs in each market is 14).
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rates do not differ significantly between the different market environments (Mann-
Whitney U-Test for period 1 observations only, p = 0.217)6. After the first few
periods, however, we observe a strong increase in unemployment in the IC treat-
ment, while the level of unemployment stays close to zero when contracts are third
party enforceable. As a consequence, the overall level of unemployment differs sub-
stantially between the different market environments. When effort is not verifiable,
the average unemployment rate is higher than 30% while it is only about 5% in the C
treatment. The difference between treatments is highly significant (Mann-Whitney
U-Test, p < 0.01). The strong difference in unemployment can also be seen when
analyzing single experimental sessions: the highest average unemployment rate in a
market where contracts are explicitly enforced is 8.7%. This number is still lower
than the lowest average unemployment rate in one of the IC sessions (21.4%).
Result 1: We observe strong differences in unemployment between the
two treatments. Under explicit contract enforcement (C treatment), un-
employment levels are close to the minimal possible level. When effort is
not verifiable (IC treatment), unemployment rises strongly before stabi-
lizing on a relatively high level.
The absence of third party contract enforcement has a strong and positive impact
on the level of unemployment. We have hypothesized in Section 3.3 that unemploy-
ment in the IC treatment could be caused by firms who decide to ration jobs and
pay fair, above market-clearing wages to those workers who are employed. In other
words, the absence of explicit contract enforcement could lead to involuntary un-
employment. Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 provide evidence that this indeed the case.
Table 3.2 summarizes the number of potential vacancies (Column 1), the number of
firms’ actual contract offers (Column 2), and the number of contract offers that are
accepted by workers (Column 4) in the two treatments. In total, firms in each treat-
ment could offer up to 1260 contracts. Given our assumptions on the production
function, offering the maximum number of vacancies was efficient from a technolog-
ical point of view in both treatments. However, the number of actual contract offers
6All non-parametric tests use session averages as independent observations. Reported p-values
are always two-sided.
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of average unemployment over time
differs strongly between treatments. While nearly 99% of potential vacancies (1242
out of 1260) are offered in the C treatment, firms in the IC treatment make only 68%
(856 / 1260) of the possible contract offers. This indicates that the differences in
unemployment between treatments are mainly caused by firms’ decisions to ration
jobs in IC rather than by differences in workers’ contract acceptance between the two
treatments. The number of accepted contract offers (Column 4) supports this im-
pression: in both treatments, nearly all contract offers are accepted by some worker.
This indicates that differences in workers’ contract acceptance (which could, e.g., be
caused by differences in workers’ reservation wages) can not explain the differences
in unemployment between treatments.
Potential Actual Private Concluded
Vacancies Offers Offers Contracts
C treatment 1260 1242 207 1193
IC treatment 1260 856 616 849
Table 3.2: Number of potential and actual (private) contract offers made by firms.
Number of contracts accepted by workers.
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Figure 3.2: Fraction of firms offering / filling two vacancies
Figure 3.2 sheds more light on firms’ hiring policy. The dashed lines depict
the fractions of firms who offer a second vacancy in a given period. The solid
lines compare the fractions of second contract offers which are accepted by workers.
Paralleling the observation on the unemployment level, the fraction of firms who aim
at hiring two workers is initially similar in both treatments. After a few periods,
however, this fraction increases to more than 90% in the C treatment, but fewer
and fewer firms decide to employ two workers in the IC treatment. In later periods
of the experiment, a relatively stable fraction of merely 20–30% of firms offers two
contracts in this treatment. The solid lines confirm that unfilled vacancies, which
would be an indication for voluntary unemployment, are rarely observed in either
treatment. If anything, the fraction of rejected contract offers is slightly higher in
the C treatment.7
The prevalence of job rationing in the IC treatment also becomes apparent when
we analyze the hiring decisions at the firm level. Table 3.3 reports the frequencies
with which individual firms hire two workers. Paralleling the observations from
7The contract acceptance rate is 96% in the C treatment, compared to 99% in the IC treatment;
see Table 3.2. Most of the rejected offers are contracts which offer zero or negative rents to the
workers.
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Figure 3.2, a vast majority of firms employ two workers in nearly all periods when
work effort is verifiable. By contrast, in the IC treatment 74% of firms hire a second
worker in less than half of the market periods. More than 50% of firms ration jobs
even in more than 12 market periods.
Result 2: Differences in unemployment are driven by firms’ hiring de-
cisions: when contracts are not explicitly enforceable, firms offer less
contracts, and many firms employ only one worker in most periods of the
experiment.
Frequency of hiring two workers 0-2 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-14 15-18
Fraction of firms (C treatment) – – – – 0.171 0.829
Fraction of firms (IC treatment) 0.229 0.314 0.200 0.086 0.057 0.114
Table 3.3: Percentage of firms who hire two workers in a given number of market
periods (frequency with which individual firms employ two workers).
3.4.2 Contracts in the Different Market Environments
The degree of third party enforceability apparently strongly affects overall market
performance. In particular, the absence of explicit contract enforcement mechanisms
leads to involuntary unemployment caused by firms’ decision to ration jobs. In the
remainder of this section, we analyze whether the channels through which unemploy-
ment is emerging in the IC treatment are also in line with our hypotheses. We first
investigate whether the contracts which are most effective in eliciting work effort
in this treatment differ from the profit-maximizing contracts in the C treatment.
We then take a closer look at the IC treatment and analyze how the emergence of
unemployment shapes the interaction between firms and workers.
We have argued in Section 3.3 that firms could try to elicit high work efforts by
paying high wages and engaging in long-term employment relationships when third
party contract enforcement is not feasible (IC treatment). On the other hand, the
profit maximizing contract for firms in the C treatment should be the one which
minimizes wage costs for a given—explicitly enforced—effort level. Furthermore,
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of average wage over time
there is no reason to (re-)employ specific workers via private contract offers when
effort is verifiable.
Figure 3.3 and Table 3.4 show that these predictions are indeed borne out by
our data. In Figure 3.3, we depict the average wage level in the two treatment
conditions. When contracts are explicitly enforced, wages quickly converge to a
level close to the market-clearing wage predicted in Section 3.3. Remember that in
this treatment, profit-maximizing firms require the maximum possible effort of 10.
Since unemployment benefits are set to zero, profit-maximizing firms should thus
pay a wage equal to c(10) = 18. The wages observed in the C treatment are very
close to this level: on average, firms pay 22.9 points to their workers (in the second
half of the experiment, this value even decreases to 21.3 points). This contrasts
sharply with the results for the IC treatment where effort is not verifiable. Firms in
this treatment pay an average wage of 34.8 points to their workers. Moreover, wage
differences across treatments increase over time. Overall, the differences in wages
are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U-Test, p < 0.01). Table 3.4 analyzes
the profitability of these wage payments from a firm’s perspective. In particular, we
compare the profitability of paying higher wages and making private contract offers
in the two treatments. As expected, paying higher wages when explicit contract
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Dependent variable: Firm profits
C treatment IC treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage -0.814*** -0.808*** 0.485*** 0.310**
(0.137) (0.143) (0.085) (0.101)
Private -2.529 -0.818 18.250*** 12.422***
(3.619) (2.787) (2.828) (2.565)
Constant 64.817*** 46.671*** 64.823*** 8.288*** 11.975*** 5.420
(3.609) (0.802) (3.541) (2.808) (1.293) (3.006)
N 1193 1193 1193 849 849 849
R2 0.241 0.007 0.242 0.150 0.160 0.204
Table 3.4: Profitability of different contracts in the C treatment (Columns (1)–(3))
and the IC treatment (Columns (4)–(6)). The dependent variable is a firm’s profit
from a given contract. “Private” is a dummy equal to “1” (“0”) if a firm-worker
relation was initiated by a private (public) contract offer. ∗∗∗ indicates significance
on the 1-percent level, ∗∗ significance on the 5-percent level, ∗ significance on the 10-
percent level. Reported standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering
on session level.
enforcement is possible unambiguously decreases firms’ profits (see Columns (1)
and (3) of Table 3.4). Whether an employment relation is initiated by a private or
public contract offer has no impact on profits in the C treatment (see Columns (2)
and (3)). Therefore, it is not surprising that only few firms in this treatment make
private contract offers (see Column 3 of Table 3.2).
These findings differ strongly to those obtained when explicit contract enforce-
ment is not feasible where more than 70% of employment relations are initiated by a
private contract offer (see Column 3 of Table 3.2). Firms indeed seem to care much
more which worker they employ in the IC treatment. Is this selectivity in firms’ hir-
ing decision also reflected in a higher profitability of private contracts? Columns (5)
and (6) of Table 3.4 confirm that this is the case. Trades initiated by a private con-
tract offer are more profitable for firms. Moreover, treatments also differ strongly
with respect to the relationship between firm profits and wages paid. As can be
seen in Columns (4) and (6) of Table 3.4, paying higher wages increases firms’ prof-
71
its in the IC treatment. This indicates that the direct cost of paying higher wages
is more than compensated by workers’ increase in effort when generous wages are
paid. Thus, the strong differences in wages observed in Figure 3.3 are well-founded
from firms’ perspective and reflect differences in the profitability of certain contracts
in the two different market environments.
The differences in contracting between the two treatments is also reflected in the
average duration of employment relationships. Since effort is verifiable, there is no
need to build up long-term work relations in the C treatment; the average duration of
a relationship in which a firm hires a specific worker (by directing a private contract
offer towards him) is 1.35 periods. On the other hand, repeated interaction between
firms and workers, i.e., the emergence of long-term work relationships is frequently
observed in the IC treatment: conditional on hiring a worker through a private
contract offer, firms employ the same worker on average for 2.90 periods. 51% of
firms in this treatment rehire at least one specific worker for more than half of the
market periods without interruption. The corresponding fraction of firms who does
so in the C treatment is merely 3%.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of average effort over time
Firms’ strategy to ration job offers, pay high wages and repeatedly employ the
same workers in the IC treatment gives powerful incentives for workers to provide
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effort, although effort is not explicitly enforced. Figure 3.4 depicts the average level
of effort in the two treatments. In line with the theoretical hypotheses and previous
evidence (Brown et al. 2004, Brown et al. 2008), the figure indicates that coopera-
tion can indeed be sustained when third party contract enforcement is absent. While
efforts in the IC treatment are lower than in the C treatment where they are explic-
itly enforced (Mann-Whitney U-Test, p < 0.01), the figure demonstrates that the
implicit incentives provided through firms’ contracting strategy are strong enough to
elicit relatively high work effort. Although effort is not verifiable, workers choose an
effort level of 8–10 in more than 50% of cases, and minimum effort is observed in only
12% of cases. Compared to the strong difference in unemployment between treat-
ments, the difference in the second measure of market efficiency—workers’ effort—is
relatively small.
Result 3: Successful firms use different contracting policies in the two
treatments. When effort is verifiable (C treatment), firms increase profits
by employing workers at the lowest incentive compatible wage. When
third party contract enforcement is absent, firms operate profitably if they
pay generous wages and hire specific workers through private contract
offers.
3.4.3 Determinants and Consequences of Job Rationing
We now turn to the determinants of firms’ decision to ration jobs in the IC treatment.
We first concentrate on differences in profits between the different “types” of firms,
i.e., firms who employ two workers and firms who ration jobs and employ only one
worker.8 Is the high unemployment in the IC treatment caused by overall higher
profits of firms who employ only one worker, as suggested by the analysis of workers
8Strictly speaking, there are no stable “types” of firms in our experiment since firms could
decide in each market period how many workers they want to hire. Although the correlation
between individual firms’ job rationing decisions in consecutive periods is highly positive (ρ = 0.47,
p < 0.01), some firms also switch between hiring one or two workers. Firms keep their “type” in
75.6% of cases, two-worker firms become one-worker firms in 13.8% of cases, and one-worker firms
employ two workers in the following period in 10.6% of cases. For ease of exposition, in what
follows we will thus refer to a firm as “one-worker firm” (“two–worker firm”) if it employs one
(two) workers in a given market period.
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with “strictly egalitarian” fairness preferences in Section 3.3? On average, one-
worker firms in this treatment indeed earn somewhat higher profits. Average profits
of firms who employ one worker in a given period are 36.9 points compared to 29.4
points in two-worker firms (see Column (1) in Table 3.5). However, this difference
in profits is not statistically significant.
Dependent variable: Firm profits
all market periods periods periods 1-worker 2-worker
periods 1–6 7–12 13–18 firms firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2-worker -7.499 -12.630*** -3.494 -0.987
(5.110) (2.218) (6.880) (7.290)
Period 0.370 1.087**
(0.200) (0.390)
Period18 -42.869*** -33.714**
(7.141) (11.625)
Constant 36.879*** 36.587*** 40.757*** 33.395*** 35.652*** 22.283***
(2.784) (1.940) (2.520) (3.836) (0.594) (1.850)
N 623 208 209 206 397 226
R2 0.030 0.102 0.008 <0.001 0.238 0.094
Table 3.5: Profit differences between one-worker firms and two-worker firms in the
IC treatment. The dependent variable is a firm’s total period profit. “2-worker”
is a dummy equal to “1” (“0”) if a firm employs two (one) workers in a given
period. “Period18” is a dummy equal to “1” for the final market period. ∗∗∗ indicates
significance on the 1-percent level, ∗∗ significance on the 5-percent level, ∗ significance
on the 10-percent level. Reported standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for
clustering on session level.
The comparison of average profits over all market periods hides an interesting
time pattern in profits for the different types of firms. Figure 3.5 depicts firms’
profits in the IC treatment over time. The figure suggests that, initially, two-worker
firms earn considerably less than one-worker firms, but that this difference in profits
disappears over the course of the experiment. Comparing firms’ profits in the first
6 periods yields a profit difference 12.6 points which is significant at the 1% level
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Figure 3.5: Firm profits in 1-worker firms and 2-worker firms (IC treatment)
(see Column (2) of Table 3.5). Paralleling the pattern observed in Figure 3.5, this
difference in profitability between the different types of firms vanishes in later market
periods (cf. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.5). Regressions analyzing the dynamics
of profits for the two different types of firms separately indicate that the convergence
in profits is caused by an increase in two-worker firms’ profitability. Controlling for
the drop in profits in the final period, two-worker firms significantly increase their
profitability over the course of the experiment (see Column (6) of Table 3.5). At
the same time, profits of one-worker firms increase weakly, but not significantly (see
Column (5) of Table 3.5). This shows that a (stronger) increase of profits of two-
worker firms rather than a decrease of profits in one-worker firms accounts for the
convergence of profits between the different firm types.
Result 4: When third party contract enforcement is absent, one-worker
firms are initially more profitable than two-worker firms. In later periods,
profits in two-worker firms converge to the profit levels of one-worker
firms.
In Section 3.3, we have argued that the relative profitability of employing one or
two workers in the IC treatment should depend on what constitutes a fair contract
offer. If fair-minded workers have strictly egalitarian fairness preferences, one-worker
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firms will always be more profitable. The analysis of firm profits in the IC treatment
has demonstrated that, in the beginning of the experiment, this seems to be case. In
this sense, profit differences could account for the strong increase in unemployment
in these periods. However, the analyses also have shown that a relatively stable
fraction of firms employ two workers in later periods of the experiment (see Figure
3.2) and that these firms manage to earn similar profits as one-worker firms. The
only way how two-worker firms can catch up in terms of profits are differences in
the effort-wage relation between different types of firms. Because of the decreasing-
returns-to-scale production technology, two-worker firms can operate as profitably
as one-worker firms only if workers accept receiving a lower share of the surplus,
and put in “extra” effort for a given wage level compared to workers in one-worker
firms. Thus, if the effort-wage relation gets steeper over time in two-worker firms,
this could explain the increase in these firms’ profits observed in Figure 3.5.
Table 3.6 reports estimation results on the relationship between wages and work-
ers’ effort choices in the IC treatment. To avoid biases due to the strong drop in
efforts in the final period of the market (cf. Figure 3.4), final-period observations are
excluded from the analysis. The estimation shows that the effort-wage relations are
positively sloped both for one-worker firms and two-worker firms (see Columns (1)
and (4) of Table 3.6). However, the dynamics of the workers’ effort choices indeed
differ between the different types of firms. Controlling for wages paid, average effort
in two-worker firms increases over time (see Column (5)). Column (6) confirms that
this is the result of a steeper wage-effort relationship, i.e., for any given level of the
wage workers in two-worker firms are willing to provide higher efforts over time.
Columns (2) and (3) show that for workers employed in one-worker firms this effect
is absent. For a given wage, these workers provide similar levels of effort throughout
the experiment.
Result 5: The convergence in profitability of one-worker firms and two-
worker firms can be attributed to an increasing steepness in the effort-
wage relation of two-worker firms: for a given wage level, workers in
two-worker firms are increasingly willing to provide high levels of effort.
It seems as if the firms who employ two workers are able to use the increased
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Dependent variable: Effort
1-worker firms 2-worker firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.129*** 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.134***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
Period 0.011 -0.037 0.082** -0.051*
(0.029) (0.148) (0.024) (0.023)
Wage*Period 0.001 0.004**
(0.003) (0.001)
Constant 2.243** 2.157*** 2.620** 1.518** 0.881*** 1.857***
(0.522) (0.325) (0.093) (0.327) (0.138) (0.301)
N 372 372 372 438 438 438
R2 0.643 0.644 0.644 0.595 0.610 0.620
Table 3.6: Determinants of worker effort in the IC treatment. Estimations for
1-worker firms (Columns (1)–(3)) and 2-worker firms (Columns (4)–(6)). Obser-
vations from the final market period are excluded. ∗∗∗ indicates significance on the
1-percent level, ∗∗ significance on the 5-percent level, ∗ significance on the 10-percent
level. Reported standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on ses-
sion level.
level of unemployment in later periods to become more profitable. One potential
explanation for this is that unemployment may serve as a worker disciplining de-
vice. Monetary payoffs for unemployed workers are zero in our experimental setup;
therefore workers who are unemployed incur an immediate cost from not having
a job. A consequence of the increase in unemployment is that being unemployed
becomes relatively more costly. There are two reasons for this effect: first, due to
firms’ job rationing decisions, fewer and fewer job offers are available. Secondly,
more unemployed workers compete for a job offer when unemployment is high. It
should thus be less likely to get a job offer when unemployment is high.
Table 3.7 summarizes the job acquisition rate of previously unemployed workers
in the IC treatment. The figures depict the fraction of workers who were unemployed
in period t−1 and acquire a job in period t (either through a private or a public con-
tract offer). The acquisition rate decreases from more than 50% in early periods to
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about 20-35% in later periods. The correlation between the (lagged) unemployment
rate and the job acquisition rate is strongly negative (ρ = −0.53, p < 0.01).
Period (t) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Acquisition rate (t) 0.78 0.51 0.52 0.41 0.52 0.39 0.26 0.33 0.35
Unemployment (t− 1) 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.37 0.36 0.36
Period (t) 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Acquisition rate (t) 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.20 0.32
Unemployment (t− 1) 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.39
Table 3.7: IC treatment: workers’ probability of being hired in period t if unem-
ployed in period t− 1.
Does the higher cost of being unemployed indeed discipline workers? Table 3.8
depicts results of probit estimations on the determinants of workers’ shirking be-
havior (reporting marginal effects). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to
“1” if a worker shirks, i.e., if he provides less than the contractually desired effort
level. Explanatory variables include the wage stipulated in the contract, the type
of contract offer, the current job acquisition rate, and a dummy equal to “1” if the
worker has been unemployed in the previous period. In line with the previous re-
sults, the estimations indicate that workers who are hired via a private offer and who
receive higher wages tend to shirk less. More importantly, however, the coefficients
for the job acquisition rate and the unemployment dummy indicate a decrease in
shirking rates through unemployment: controlling for the wage received, workers
tend to shirk less when job offers are scarce (i.e., when the job acquisition rate is
low) and when they have been unemployed before. Interestingly, we observe that
workers who have experienced unemployment themselves shirk less once they find
a job again. This suggests that, in our setup, unemployment disciplines especially
the previously unemployed workers, and not necessarily all employed workers as in
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
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Result 6: The increase in unemployment in the IC treatment leads to a
strong decrease in the job acquisition rate for unemployed workers. This
makes being or becoming unemployed more costly. The higher pressure
on workers is reflected in workers’ contract fulfillment: workers shirk
less when (i) jobs are scarce and (ii) when they have been unemployed
previously.
Dependent variable: 1 if e < eˆ
(1) (2) (3)
Wage -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployed before -0.106*** -0.127*** -0.103**
(0.036) (0.025) (0.040)
Private -0.162**
(0.079)
Acquisition rate 0.260*
(0.148)
N 849 849 849
Pseudo R2 0.162 0.172 0.174
Table 3.8: Determinants of contract fulfillment in IC treatment. Probit estima-
tions, reporting marginal effects. “Unemployed before” is a dummy equal to 1 if the
respective worker had no contract in the previous period. “Acquisition rate” is the
fraction of previously unemployed workers who find a new firm in a given period
(see Table 3.7). ∗∗∗ indicates significance on the 1-percent level, ∗∗ significance on
the 5-percent level, ∗ significance on the 10-percent level. Reported standard errors
(in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on session level.
We have seen that, for a given wage level, previously unemployed workers are
more likely to fulfill a contract by providing the contractually agreed upon effort
level. As a consequence, firms should be able to negotiate more advantageous con-
tract terms, and appropriate a higher share of the surplus when unemployment is
high. However, it is unclear so far why this helps especially the firms who employ
two workers to become more profitable.
The answer lies in the differences in contract offers between one-worker firms and
two-worker firms. Firms who employ two workers in a given period are more likely
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to hire workers who have been unemployed before. Although only roughly 20% of
firms employ two workers in later periods, these firms account for almost two thirds
(65.1%) of job offers to previously unemployed workers. One reason for this effect is
that firms who employ two workers rely more on public job offers than one-worker
firms. 70.7% of public contract offers come from firms who employ two workers.9
Another reason lies in the policies of contract renewal employed by firms who employ
one vs. two workers. Table 3.9 reports estimations on determinants of contract
renewal in the IC treatment. Comparing the re-employment strategies of different
firm types shows that, for a given effort level provided, workers in two-worker firms
face a higher probability of being dismissed (see Column (1) of Table 3.9). The same
holds even when we control for firms’ total profits (see Column (2) of Table 3.9).
Only if an individual worker’s effort is so high that it yields firm profits comparable
to those in one-worker firms, the likelihood of being re-employed does not differ from
workers in one-worker firms (Column (3) of Table 3.9). Since workers in two-worker
firms are less productive due to decreasing returns to scale, this implies a much
tighter contract renewal policy of two-worker firms as compared to one-worker firms.
In other words, for a given wage level a worker employed in a two-worker firm has to
provide (costly) extra effort in order to attain re-employment chances comparable
to a worker in a one-worker firm.
Result 7: Due to firms’ strategies of offering and renewing work con-
tracts, previously unemployed workers are more likely to be hired by firms
who employ two workers.
The higher likelihood of hiring workers from the pool of unemployed workers, to-
gether with the stricter contract renewal policy explains why two-worker firms more
than proportionally profit from high unemployment in the IC treatment. Another
consequence of the tighter re-employment policy of two-worker firms is a higher
turnover rate and, overall, shorter employment relations compared to one-worker
firms. Only in 19% of cases, two-worker firms hire the same workers in two consec-
utive periods. The comparable number for one-worker firms is 83%.
9This figure excludes contract offers from the first period where most firms (i) employ two
workers and (ii) do so via public contract offers because they have not gained experience with
specific workers.
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Dependent variable:
1 if worker is not re-hired
(1) (2) (3)
2-worker 0.165*** 0.200** -0.093
(0.039) (0.089) (0.108)
Effort worker i -0.138***
(0.012)
Firm’s total profit -0.010***
(0.001)
Firm’s profit from worker i’s effort -0.016***
(0.002)
Period -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.023***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
N 807 807 807
Pseudo R2 0.386 0.200 0.241
Table 3.9: Determinants of worker dismissal. Probit estimations, reporting
marginal effects. “2-worker” is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm employs 2 workers
in a given period. ∗∗∗ indicates significance on the 1-percent level, ∗∗ significance on
the 5-percent level, ∗ significance on the 10-percent level. Reported standard errors
(in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on session level.
Summarizing our findings, the outcomes in the IC treatment resemble an endoge-
nously “segmented” labor market: on the one hand, the majority of firms employ
only one worker when contracts are not third party enforceable. These firms are
characterized by stable employment relationships based on private contract offers
and contingent contract renewal. Moreover, these firms share the gains from trade
generously, paying high wages to their workers which result in high work effort and
high monetary payoffs both for workers and firms. On the other hand, a minority of
firms operates successfully by employing two workers when unemployment is high.
Interactions between these firms and their workers resembles those in “secondary”
labor markets (Saint-Paul 1996). In comparison to one-worker firms, successful two-
worker firms are characterized by low wages and thus low rent payments to workers.
Moreover, these firms exhibit a higher turnover rate due to a tighter contract re-
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newal policy and a higher fraction of public contract offers. High unemployment
disproportionally helps these firms, since they are more likely to hire previously un-
employed workers. For a given wage, these workers tend to shirk particularly little.
The “secondary sector” firms are therefore able to pay lower wages to elicit a certain
level of work effort. When unemployment is high, this strategy yields profits similar
to those of firms who ration jobs and rely on long-term employment relations and
high wages.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have analyzed the relationship between contract enforcement
and the emergence of involuntary unemployment. In an experimental labor market
where the trading parties can form long-term relationships, we compared a work
environment where contracts were not third party enforceable to a situation where
contracts were “complete” and effort was verifiable.
Our main findings are as follows: unemployment is much higher in the treat-
ment without explicit contract enforcement. Importantly, unemployment in this
treatment is involuntary, being caused by the firms’ employment and contracting
policy. Firms pay high wages but offer fewer vacancies than possible and techno-
logically efficient. This policy, however, succeeds in eliciting high efforts from the
employed workers. When complete contracts can be written, wages are close to
the market clearing level, firms do not ration jobs, and unemployment is mostly
voluntary.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first which empirically establishes
a direct link between contract enforcement and the emergence of unemployment.
This connection has long been discussed in efficiency-wage theories (Shapiro and
Stiglitz 1984, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Our find-
ings also contribute to the literature on the efficiency-wage foundation of dual labor
markets (Bulow and Summers 1986, Saint-Paul 1996). Although firms face identi-
cal technological constraints in our setup, we observe a segmentation of the labor
market when third party contract enforcement is not feasible. Most firms ration
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the number of jobs, and build up long-term employment relations which are char-
acterized by generous rent-sharing between firms and workers. Behavior of these
firms and their workers seems isolated from the market environment (e.g., the level
of unemployment). On the other hand, there is also a minority of firms operating
successfully without rationing job offers. These firms pay lower rents to workers,
and use a tighter re-employment policy. Market conditions are very important for
these firms: since they employ more workers through public contract offers and since
previously unemployed workers shirk less, these firms become profitable only when
unemployment is high.
83
84
Chapter 4
Behavior in Multi-Stage
Elimination Tournaments
4.1 Introduction
Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms and other
hierarchical organizations. According to Lazear and Gibbs (2008), they are probably
the most important source of extrinsic motivation for middle managers in most firms.
The prospect of being promoted to a better-paid job creates incentives to work hard,
even if current income is not tied to performance. In virtually all firms those who
get promoted compete again for subsequent promotions: in many companies, there
are up to a dozen hierarchical levels between the CEO and entry-level management
(Belzil and Bognanno 2008, Lazear and Gibbs 2008). The prevalence of internal
labor markets is also underlined by the fact that hiring is concentrated on lower
levels of the hierarchy and that positions on higher ranks are filled primarily through
promotion (Baker et al. 1994, Bognanno 2001). In a seminal contribution, Rosen
(1986) has modelled the competition for promotion in such hierarchies as a multi-
stage elimination tournament where in each stage fewer agents are selected for the
next step of the career ladder. Incentives generated in such tournaments depend
on two important components of the organizational structure: the immediate wage
increase for an agent who gets promoted and the option value of competing in further
stages of the tournament, i.e., having the chance to earn even higher wages.
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Although the importance of multi-stage elimination tournaments is undisputed,
stringent empirical tests of their incentive effects are scarce. In this chapter, we
provide a step towards closing this gap with the help of a controlled laboratory ex-
periment. Our main questions are: do people take future stages of a tournament into
account when deciding on current effort? Are multi-stage elimination setups behav-
iorally different from simple one-stage tournaments? How does the wage structure
in multi-stage tournaments affect the provision of effort?
We study these questions by comparing three treatments. Our main treatment
is a two-stage tournament (TS ) in which four subjects compete for being promoted
to the second stage. Promotion depends on subjects’ output which is a function
of costly effort and an individual noise term. The two subjects with the lowest
output levels in the first stage are eliminated from further competition and receive
a low wage. The two subjects with the highest output levels in the first stage are
promoted, i.e., they are allowed to take part in the second stage where they compete
against each other again. The subject with the highest second-stage output receives
a high wage, whereas the other finalist is paid an intermediate wage. Parameters
in this treatment are chosen to make the tournament incentive maintaining in the
sense that equilibrium effort is identical in both stages (Rosen 1986).
We compare this treatment to a one-stage tournament (OS ) in which four sub-
jects compete once for two top positions. Wages for the promoted subjects are
chosen such that the one-stage tournament is strategically equivalent to the first
stage of TS. This means that promoted subjects in OS earn the sum of the inter-
mediate wage in TS and the monetary equivalent of the second-stage option value
in that tournament, implying that equilibrium effort is the same in both treat-
ments. Comparing OS and TS thus allows testing whether strategic equivalence
translates into behavioral equivalence. Our third treatment (TSC ) is identical to
the TS treatment with the exception that the wage structure is more convex, i.e.,
the intermediate wage is smaller in TSC. It is designed to study how subjects react
to differences in the wage structure. In particular, we can test whether subjects—as
predicted by theory—exert lower efforts in the first and higher efforts in the second
stage under the more convex wage structure of TSC compared to TS.
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Our findings can be summarized as follows: First, average behavior is remarkably
close to the predictions of tournament theory in our one-stage treatment. This
parallels findings of previous experiments on symmetric one-stage tournaments (e.g.,
Bull et al. 1987, Orrison et al. 2004). Second, behavior in the TS treatment indicates
that subjects take the option value of future promotion possibilities into account
when deciding on their work effort in multi-stage tournaments. Third, we also
observe important departures from theoretical predictions in the TS treatment.
Behavior in the first stage of TS differs strongly both from the one-stage treatment
and from theoretical predictions. Subjects exert significantly higher efforts in the
first stage of the two-stage tournament. Fourth, the results of the TSC treatment
confirm the occurrence of excess effort provision in the first stage of the tournament.
Subjects react only weakly to the change in the wage structure, implying that first-
stage excess effort is even higher in TSC. Finally, the TS treatment is incentive
maintaining in the sense that efforts in the second stage are not significantly different
from first-stage efforts.
Most promotion tournaments that we observe in firms and other hierarchical
organizations have multiple stages. Our results indicate that the mechanisms of in-
centive provision in multi-stage tournaments largely operate as suggested by theory.
People do not only respond to differences in prizes, or wages, but are also motivated
by the option value generated by future promotion possibilities. Our findings also
provide insights with regard to the question whether one-stage tournaments are be-
haviorally equivalent to multi-stage designs. Adding one or more stages seems to
make a fundamental difference, as people tend to exert excess effort in early stages
of the tournament. This shows that one cannot necessarily draw inferences from
simple one-stage setups to more complex tournaments.
The finding that people tend to exert excess effort in early stages of a multi-
stage competition also has interesting organizational implications. If—as our find-
ings suggest—multi-stage competitions provoke excess effort exertion by employees,
this may offer a possible explanation why firms rely heavily on promotion based
incentive schemes even if more direct means of performance assessment and com-
pensation are available. Excess effort makes a promotion tournament “cheaper” for
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principals compared to other incentive schemes such as piece rates or bonus con-
tracts. Moreover, excess effort influences the “optimal architecture” of promotion
tournaments and other contests (see Moldovanu and Sela 2006).
The chapter complements previous studies which have used field data from ex-
ecutive compensation, sports, or agricultural production to evaluate predictions of
tournament theory (e.g., Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990, Knoeber and Thurman
1994, Bognanno 2001). It has been found that many implications of tournament
theory are consistent with empirical observations: for instance, higher prizes tend
to increase performance (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990), wage profiles in the field
are convexly increasing (Eriksson 1999), and winner prizes increase with the number
of competitors (Bognanno 2001). An advantage of testing tournament theory with
laboratory experiments is the possibility to directly test pure incentive effects of
tournaments. For instance, one can measure agents’ behavioral reactions to changes
in the wage structure without being concerned that the composition of the workforce
might change due to the modified incentive scheme (Lazear 2000, Dohmen and Falk
2006). Experimental data also allows to rule out influences of unobservable variables
that might affect actual promotion decisions in the field, like agents’ soft skills or
supervisor favoritism.
A number of previous papers have studied various aspects of tournaments in
experiments, such as the effects of different prize spreads (Bull et al. 1987, Harbring
and Irlenbusch 2003), sabotage activities (Falk, Fehr and Huffman 2008, Harbring
and Irlenbusch 2008) or asymmetries in promotion chances (Schotter and Weigelt
1992). In contrast to our work, this literature concentrates on one-stage tourna-
ments. In view of our findings it is not clear to what extent these previous findings
translate to multi-stage setups. For instance, more competitive behavior (excess
effort) in early stages might also lead to an increase in sabotage activities in multi-
stage tournaments.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents
a simple model of multi-stage elimination tournaments on which our experiment
is based. Section 4.3 discusses our experimental design and derives hypotheses.
Section 4.4 shows the main results and Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 A Simple Model of Multi-Stage Elimination
Tournaments
We consider a simple elimination tournament in which four identical agents compete
for promotion.1 The promotion decision depends on relative output produced by
the agents. Competition consists of two stages: in the first stage, all four agents
compete against each other. The two agents with the lowest output levels in that
stage receive a wage wlow and are eliminated from further competition. The two
agents with the highest output levels in the first stage are promoted, i.e., they are
allowed to take part in the second stage (or “final”) where they compete against
each other again. The agent who produces more output in the second stage receives
a wage whigh, whereas the other finalist gets an intermediate wage wmed. Note that
the decision of who receives whigh or wmed does not depend on the first-stage output
of the finalists.
This two-stage elimination tournament can be modeled as follows. In the first
stage of the tournament four agents i = 1, 2, 3, 4 compete against each other. Agents
who participate in stage k ∈ {1, 2} individually produce output yi,k according to the
production function
yi,k = ei,k + ²i,k
where ei,k denotes the effort level that agent i exerts in stage k. ²i,k is a random
shock faced by agent i in stage k. Shocks are assumed to be drawn independently for
each agent in each stage. For simplicity, we assume that ²i,k is uniformly distributed
on the interval [−q, q].2 Agent i’s output in stage k does not depend on previous
effort or output and the production technology is identical for all agents i in all
stages k. Agents bear the cost of effort exertion. We assume the cost function to be
1Most of the assumptions below follow the classic (one-stage) tournament model introduced by
Lazear and Rosen (1981).
2Virtually all tournament experiments use the uniform distribution, primarily because its con-
cept is easy to understand for experimental subjects. The predictions of the model, however, can
be generalized to other distributions of shocks. Lazear and Rosen (1981) discuss which conditions
have to be fulfilled for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
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of the following form:
C(ei,1, ei,2) =
e2i,1
c
+
e2i,2
c
Note that this specification implies separability of costs across stages, i.e., in line
with Rosen (1986) there is also no carry-over of costs between stages. Furthermore,
we assume that agents are identical and risk-neutral with utility functions which are
additively separable in wages and effort costs
Ui(w, ei,1, ei,2) = w − C(ei,1, ei,2)
For the derivation of equilibrium predictions we restrict our attention to the set
of symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The two-stage tournament can be
solved by backward induction. Because (i) the decision who wins the second stage
solely depends on the output of the finalists in this stage, (ii) there is no cost carry-
over between stages and (iii) the random terms are independently distributed both
across stages and agents, the final of our two-stage tournament is equivalent to a
simple one-stage tournament in which two participants compete for a promotion.
Given that agent i has reached the second stage where two agents compete for one
winner prize whigh and one loser prize wmed, he chooses stage-two effort ei,2 in order
to maximize an expected utility function of the following form:3
EUi(whigh, wmed, ei,2, ej,2) = pi(yi,2 > yj,2)whigh+[1−pi(yi,2 > yj,2)]wmed−C(ei,1, ei,2)
pi(yi,2 > yj,2) denotes the probability that i’s output in stage two is greater than
the output of agent j. With our assumptions regarding the production function and
random terms, this expression can be rewritten as follows:
EUi(whigh, wmed, ei,2, ej,2) = F²j,2−²i,2 [ei,2 − ej,2](whigh − wmed) + wmed − C(ei,1, ei,2)
where F²j,2−²i,2 [·] denotes the cdf of the difference between random terms ²j,2, ²i,2.
Maximizing EUi(·) over ei,2 yields the following first-order condition:
f²j,2−²i,2(ei,2 − ej,2)(whigh − wmed) =
∂C(·)
∂ei,2
3The parameters chosen in our experimental treatments (see below) ensure that all participation
constraints are fulfilled. We therefore do not explicitly consider them here.
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Assuming symmetry yields f²j,k−²i,k(0) =
1
2q
for ²i,k, ²j,k ∼ U [−q, q]. The symmetric
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage tournament thus entails the
following second-stage effort level e∗,TSi,2 for the two agents who participate in the
final:
e∗,TSi,2 =
(whigh − wmed)c
4q
Given that both finalists play this equilibrium, the expected utility gain in the
final, i.e., the continuation value for an agent in the first stage is given as follows
EVi,2 = wmed +
1
2
[whigh − wmed]−
(
e∗,TSi,2
)2
c
An agent who reaches the final earns a wage of wmed for sure. By exerting stage-
two effort e∗,TSi,2 , he has the chance to receive the higher wage whigh instead. In the
symmetric equilibrium, this occurs with probability 1
2
. Moreover, he has to pay the
cost of effort exertion in the second stage.
Turning to the analysis of the tournament’s first stage, it is obvious that (in
expected values) this stage can be modeled as a one-stage tournament between four
agents with two winner prizes EVi,2 and two loser prizes wlow (see Rosen 1986).
The derivation of equilibrium effort for such a tournament follows the same steps as
above. Alternatively we can apply a result from Orrison et al. (2004) who show that
equilibria of fully symmetric one-stage tournaments are not affected by “organiza-
tional replication” for our specification of the production function, cost function,
and random terms. This implies that an equilibrium in a tournament with two
identical participants and one winner prize is also an equilibrium in a tournament
with four identical participants and two winner prizes.4
As a shortcut we can therefore use the solution for e∗,TSi,2 and simply replace whigh
and wmed with EVi,2 and wlow to obtain the equilibrium effort level for the first stage:
e∗,TSi,1 =
(EVi,2 − wlow)c
4q
=
(
wmed − wlow + 12 [whigh − wmed]−
(e∗,TSi,2 )
2
c
)
c
4q
4More generally Orrison et al. (2004) show that an equilibrium in a tournament with n partic-
ipants and 12n winner prizes is still an equilibrium in a tournament with mn participants and
m
2 n
winner prizes.
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This expression illustrates the two components of incentive provision in multi-
stage tournaments. By winning the first stage and qualifying for the final, an agent
receives an immediate wage gain (wmed − wlow), but additionally has the option to
compete in the final and win the top prize whigh. The value of this option is
1
2
[whigh − wmed]−
(
e∗,TSi,2
)2
c
.
Several aspects of the model deserve special emphasis. First, our design closely
follows the original model of elimination tournaments by Rosen (1986) with one
notable exception: instead of having two semifinals with two participants each,
who compete for one slot in the final, we analyze a setup with four participants
competing for two slots in the final. While both variants are theoretically equivalent
for symmetric agents, we employ the latter because it allows us to design a one-stage
tournament which is procedurally as close as possible to our main treatment.5 Note
also that we abstract from heterogeneous abilities of participants in order to keep
the design as simple and parsimonious as possible. This allows us to focus on the
incentive aspect of elimination tournaments by ruling out selection of more able
individuals into higher positions of a hierarchy. Including the selection aspect of
tournaments would be an interesting follow-up to our study.
4.3 Experimental Design
4.3.1 Treatments and Hypotheses
Our experiment comprises of three treatments that allow us to study behavior in
multi-stage tournaments from different angles. For all treatments our benchmark
is the prediction of the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The main
treatment TS is a two-stage elimination tournament with four participants compet-
ing for whigh, wmed, and wlow as discussed in the previous section. We compare this
treatment to a one-stage tournament (OS ) in which four subjects compete for two
5In particular—as will become clear in the next section—both tournaments have the same
number of participants and subjects compete for the same number of promotions.
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top positions. The two subjects with the highest output levels receive a wage w′med
in OS while the two losers of the competition receive a wage wlow. The OS treat-
ment fulfills several purposes. First, it serves as a validity check for our results given
that a number of studies on one-stage tournaments already exists. In particular, our
parametrization of this treatment is very close to a treatment from Orrison et al.
(2004).
More importantly, however, the OS treatment allows us to investigate whether
one-stage tournaments are behaviorally different from multi-stage ones. To investi-
gate this question we design OS such that it is strategically equivalent to the first
stage of the two-stage tournament TS. As discussed in the previous section the first
stage of a two-stage tournament can be interpreted as a one-stage tournament in
which agents compete for the expected value of participating in the second stage.
Strategic equivalence between OS and the first stage of TS is thus achieved by
keeping wlow constant and choosing:
w′med = EVi,2 = wmed +
1
2
[whigh − wmed]−
(
e∗,TSi,2
)2
c
In other words, the wage for the promoted agents in the one-stage tournament
(w′med) is equivalent to the wage wmed from TS plus the option value of participat-
ing in the final of TS. This choice implies that equilibrium effort levels in the OS
treatment and in the first stage of the TS treatment are the same. We can therefore
formulate the behavioral equivalence hypothesis :
eOSi,1 = e
TS
i,1
In addition to comparing behavior in tournaments with different numbers of
stages, we are interested in how a change in the wage structure influences behavior
in multi-stage tournaments. This comparative statics exercise is of practical interest.
Wages are one of the variables which (within certain bounds) are most amenable to
manipulation in organizational design. We therefore compare our main treatment to
a second two-stage tournament with a more convex wage profile (TSC). It is identical
to the TS treatment with the exception that the intermediate wage w′′med in this
treatment is smaller than in TS. This implies weaker incentives (lower equilibrium
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effort) in the first stage and a higher wage spread and higher equilibrium effort in
the second stage (wage structure hypothesis):
eTSCi,1 < e
TS
i,1
eTSCi,2 > e
TS
i,2
Finally, we analyze behavior in our main treatment across stages. In the TS
treatment wages are chosen such that equilibrium efforts in the first and second stage
are equal. Remember that the two elements of incentives in multi-stage tournaments
are the wage spread and the option value of competing for further promotions. In the
final stage, the option value is zero because there are no further promotions beyond
that stage. To make the tournament in the TS treatment incentive maintaining in
the sense of Rosen (1986), this decrease in the option value in the second stage is
offset by an appropriate increase in the wage spread (whigh − wmed > wmed − wlow).
Comparing behavior across stages thus allows to test the incentive maintenance
hypothesis :
eTSi,1 = e
TS
i,2
Experimental parameters and the resulting equilibrium efforts for all treatments
are shown in Table 4.1. When deciding on their efforts, subjects could choose any
integer ei,k ∈ {0, 1, ..., 125}. The effort costs in each stage are given by
C(ei,k) =
e2i,k
2250
and ²i,k ∼ U [−60, 60].6 The parameters chosen imply equilibrium efforts of 74 in
both stages of TS and in OS, the lower intermediate wage in TSC changes equilib-
rium efforts to 42 in the first stage and 100 in the second stage of this treatment.
4.3.2 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab of the University of Bonn. A
total of 96 subjects in six sessions were divided into groups of four. We employed
6Note that, while in equilibrium all players make positive profits, the range of feasible efforts
and the specification of the cost function imply that in principle subjects could make losses. In
the few cases where this occurred, losses were deducted from the showup-fee.
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Treatment OS TS TSC
c 2250 2250 2250
q 60 60 60
whigh – 20 20
w′med / wmed / w
′′
med 13.62 12.11 9.33
wlow 5.73 5.73 5.73
e∗i,1 74 74 42
e∗i,2 – 74 100
Table 4.1: Experimental parameters and resulting equilibrium predictions.
a one-shot between-subjects design, i.e., subjects participated either in the OS, the
TS or the TSC treatment. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
Before the tournament started, subjects received detailed written instructions
on the respective treatment they took part in (OS, TS or TSC ). These were neu-
trally framed and did not contain potentially value-laden terms like “tournament”,
“final”, “winner”, etc.7 After reading the instructions subjects completed several
control questions. The experiment started only after all participants had answered
all control questions correctly. During the tournament, subjects simultaneously en-
tered their effort decision and were then asked to state their expectations about
the other participants’ efforts on the next screen. This question was not announced
beforehand. After the first stage participants in TS and TSC were only informed
about the realization of their own random draw and about whether they had been
promoted to the second stage. The finalists then again made an effort choice and
entered their expectation about their opponent’s effort. At the end of the tourna-
ment subjects in all treatments were informed about their earnings and asked to fill
in a questionnaire. The structure of the experimental session ensured that subjects’
decisions in the tournament can be treated as independent observations. The whole
experimental session lasted on average 100 minutes and subjects earned an average
of 18.25 Euro (1 Euro = 1.26 USD at the time of experiment), including a showup-fee
7Instructions for the TS treatment and the schedule of effort costs handed out to participants
can be found in Appendix D.5 and Appendix D.6, respectively.
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of 4 Euro and a fixed payment of 3 Euro for completing the questionnaire.
Note that our experimental procedures differ from previous tournament experi-
ments in that we implement a one-shot interaction structure. Previous experiments
have typically used repeated interactions. The advantage of the latter is that it
allows for learning, which is potentially important given the non-trivial decision en-
vironment in tournaments. A potential downside, however, is that repeated game
structures question the validity of static equilibrium predictions. Since we are ex-
plicitly interested in testing theoretical predictions, we decided to use a one-shot
design. This has the additional advantage that stakes in the one-shot interaction
are relatively high. We check the regularity of our results by comparing the outcome
of our OS treatment with those of similar repeated tournaments. Finding similar re-
sults would make us confident that our main findings are not driven by the one-shot
character of our set-up, but instead by treatment differences.
4.4 Results
In this section we first test whether the results for the one-stage tournament repli-
cate earlier findings from similar tournaments. We then study the dynamic aspect of
multi-stage tournaments by comparing the one-stage tournament OS to the strate-
gically equivalent first stage of the two-stage tournament TS. In a third step, we
investigate the effects of differences in the wage structure on effort provision by
comparing the two-stage tournaments TS and TSC. Finally, we address the ques-
tion whether the TS treatment is incentive maintaining by analyzing behavior in
the first and second stage of the tournament.
4.4.1 Behavior in the One-Stage Tournament
Table 4.2 reports effort decisions in the OS treatment (Column 1). Two points are
worth noting. First, efforts are on average very close to the theoretical predictions.
While the average effort of 69.9 is slightly below the Nash prediction of 74, median
effort coincides exactly with the predicted effort level. Second, there is substantial
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heterogeneity in subjects’ behavior (see also Figure 4.1).
Both observations are in line with previous findings from symmetric one-stage
designs (e.g., Bull et al. 1987, Eriksson et al. 2006). In particular, our results
replicate those found by Orrison et al. (2004) who observe an average effort of 73.3
for an almost identical tournament which was repeated 20 times using lower stakes.
The similarity of our results to those of Orrison et al. (2004) show that one of
the most important findings in the experimental literature on symmetric promotion
tournaments—average effort being close to Nash predictions—is quite robust with
respect to using one-shot vs. repeated interactions and with respect to increased
stake sizes.
Result 1: Average behavior in the one-stage tournament is close to the
predictions of the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
4.4.2 Testing Behavioral Equivalence
Our one-stage tournament and the first stage of the two-stage tournament TS are
strategically equivalent in the sense that the wage w′med in the one-stage tournament
includes the equilibrium option value of participating in the second stage of the
two-stage tournament. A comparison of eOSi,1 and e
TS
i,1 therefore serves as a test of
how subjects in the two-stage tournament perceive this option value. If subjects, for
instance, do not take the option value into account when deciding on their first stage
effort in TS, efforts in this stage should be lower compared to the OS treatment.
If subjects evaluate the option value correctly, efforts in both treatments should be
identical. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.2 show that behavior differs strongly between
the two treatments. Average effort in the first stage of the TS treatment is 89.2,
while median effort is 91. Thus, subjects behave much more competitively in the
multi-stage tournament, exerting efforts which are more than 20% higher than those
of their counterparts in the OS treatment. A Mann-Whitney U-test confirms that
this treatment difference is highly significant (p = 0.005, two-sided).
Comparing effort levels in the two treatments to the theoretical predictions de-
rived in Section 4.3 indicates that it is excess effort in TS rather than “too low”
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Treatment OS TS TSC
Average Effort 69.9 89.2 82.4
Median Effort 74 91 83
min(Effort) 1 40 40
max(Effort) 125 125 125
Variance 913.3 359.7 605.4
e∗ 74 74 42
Table 4.2: First stage behavior in the OS, TS, and TSC treatment.
effort in OS that drives the treatment difference. A t-test with the null hypothesis
that efforts are equal to Nash predictions confirms this: the null hypothesis is re-
jected in the TS treatment (p < 0.001), but cannot be rejected in OS (p = 0.453).8
Subjects’ effort choices suggest that they are not naive in the sense that they ignore
the second stage. Quite to the contrary, the two-stage elimination tournament seems
to trigger especially competitive behavior in the first stage.
The treatment difference is not just driven by some subjects choosing extreme
effort levels in the TS treatment. A closer look at the distributions of first stage
efforts in Figure 4.1 reveals instead that the whole effort distribution is shifted to
the right in the TS treatment. As a consequence, efforts are less dispersed (Levene’s
test for equality of variances, p < 0.05, two-sided). The effort distribution illustrates
that exerting excess effort is quite widespread in TS : 84% of subjects choose efforts
higher than the equilibrium effort level of 74. This compares to only 47% in the OS
treatment. The strong difference between treatments is also reflected at the lower
tail of the distribution. While the lowest effort in the OS treatment is 1, no subject
8Note that the derivation of equilibrium predictions is based on the assumption of risk neutrality.
We check the validity of this assumption by eliciting subjects’ risk preferences with an incentive
compatible lottery procedure (a detailed description of the procedure can be found in Appendix
D.7). It turns out that our experimental subject pool is close to risk neutrality: the median subject
in all three treatments is risk neutral, and the certainty equivalent of more than 50% of subjects
lies in a range of +/ − 0.25 Euro around the risk neutral certainty equivalent (equal to 2 Euro
for the lottery that was used). In addition, effort levels in TS are above theoretical predictions
irrespective of the subjects’ degree of risk aversion. Thus excess effort is not driven by subjects’
risk preferences.
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exerts effort below 40 in the TS treatment.
Result 2: Efforts in the first round of TS are significantly higher than
in the OS treatment. This difference is driven by excess effort in TS.
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Figure 4.1: Frequency of effort choices in the OS treatment and the first stage of
the TS treatment.
4.4.3 Wage Structures in Two-Stage Tournaments
In our next treatment comparison we investigate the behavioral effects of different
wage structures in two-stage tournaments. Our main interest concerns the question
whether first stage excess effort is a robust phenomenon. Is excess effort in the first
stage an artefact of the specific wage structure we used in the TS treatment, e.g.,
is it specific to the incentive maintaining wage spreads? Or do we observe excess
effort even if we reduce the incentive to provide effort in the first stage? To analyze
these questions we implemented the TSC treatment, which is identical to the TS
treatment except that the subject who produces less output in the second stage
receives only w′′med = 9.33 Euro instead of wmed = 12.11 Euro. This more convex
wage profile has the following theoretical implications. Incentives to provide effort
in the first stage are weakened—the equilibrium effort level in the first stage of TSC
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is only 42 instead of 74 in the TS treatment. In the second stage, equilibrium effort
increases from 74 to 100 (see Table 4.1).
Column 3 of Table 4.2 summarizes behavior in the first stage of the TSC treat-
ment. Efforts in the first stage are much higher than theoretically predicted. The
average effort level is 82.4 points, about 40 points higher than the equilibrium effort
level of 42. A t-test with the null hypothesis that efforts are equal to the Nash
prediction confirms that effort choices are significantly above the equilibrium pre-
diction (p < 0.001). Indeed, about 88% of subjects choose efforts higher than 42.
This suggests that excess effort in the first stage of our two-stage tournaments is
robust to differences in the wage structure. Comparing effort choices in the TSC
treatment to those observed in TS reveals that subjects react only weakly to the
change in the wage structure between the two treatments. Average effort in TSC
is only 7 points lower than in TS. This finding is striking given that there is a 32-
point difference in equilibrium efforts. Despite the fact that first stage incentives
are much weaker than in TS, effort choices do not differ significantly between the
two treatments (Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.245, two-sided).
Result 3: The more convex wage structure in TSC induces even higher
excess effort in the first stage. First stage efforts in TS and TSC are
not significantly different, despite much weaker incentives in the TSC
treatment.
4.4.4 Testing Incentive Maintenance
Finally, we turn to behavior in the second stage of the TS treatment. Remember that
parameters were chosen such that the tournament in TS is incentive maintaining,
i.e., equilibrium effort levels are the same (equal to 74) in both stages. We know
already that efforts are above the equilibrium prediction in the first stage of TS. In
this sense, we can reject the hypothesis of equilibrium effort choices in both stage of
TS. It remains to show, however, whether effort levels are the same in both stages of
the tournament, or whether they differ. Does the two-stage character of TS induce
above equilibrium effort also in the second stage or do players reduce efforts relative
to their first stage behavior?
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In turns out that the the evidence is mixed. On average, effort decreases when
comparing behavior across stages in the TS treatment. Average effort in the first
stage is 89, in the final it goes down to 82. The median effort choice decreases
from 91 to 87.5. Note that average effort in the first stage includes the efforts of
those who did not make it to the second stage. Since—by design of the promotion
tournament—the latter usually exerted lower effort, the decrease from stage one to
stage two is larger if we consider only finalists’ behavior. Their average effort in the
first stage is 96, implying that on average finalists decrease their effort by 14 points.
However, these numbers hide considerable heterogeneity on an individual level: the
fraction of finalists who decrease their effort in the second stage is only slightly
higher than the fraction of subjects who increase it (50% and 44%, respectively). It
is therefore not surprising that the overall decrease in finalists’ efforts is insignificant
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value = 0.289). However, those who adjust their effort
downwards on average do so much stronger than those who raise their effort.
Does this mean that excess effort in the first stage just mirrors the lower efforts
in the second stage? That is, do subjects expect low effort levels and thus low
effort costs in the second stage and therefore increase their first stage effort due to a
higher (perceived) option value? While this might be the case for some finalists, we
can rule out that it accounts for first stage behavior on a more general level as, on
average, effort choices in the second stage are still above the equilibrium prediction.
We can also use the observed first stage effort choice of a subject to calculate the
option value implicitly underlying her decision. Using this option value, we can
then construct the (hypothetical) second stage effort level which would rationalize
the first stage effort choice of the subject at hand. For instance, if a subject beliefs
that all players will exert zero effort in the second stage, her subjective option value
increases to 1
2
[whigh−wmed] since (e
TS
i,2 )
2
c
= 0 (see Section 4.2). Assuming this option
value instead of the equilibrium option value rationalizes a first stage effort of 97
(using the wages and cost parameters of TS ). Conducting the calculation for the
first stage effort choice of the median subject in TS (equal to 91) yields an implied
second stage effort of 37. I.e., if the median subject had expected a second stage
effort level of 37, the perceived option value would rationalize her observed first
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stage effort choice. This value is, however, far below the actual effort choices in the
second stage (cp. Table 4.2).9 The expectation of low second stage effort levels can
thus not account for the observed excess effort in the first stage of TS.
Result 4: Efforts in the second stage of TS are lower, but not signif-
icantly different from efforts in the first stage. In this sense, the TS
treatment is incentive maintaining.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Promotions in most hierarchical organizations take the form of multi-stage elimina-
tion tournaments. In this chapter we have studied behavior in such tournaments
with simple laboratory experiments. Our results demonstrate the importance of
carefully analyzing the incentive effects of promotions in multi-level hierarchies.
They show that the basic logic of incentive provision in multi-stage elimination
tournaments works in the sense that people take future promotion possibilities into
account when deciding on current work effort. However, we also observe important
departures from theoretical predictions. Subjects tend to exert excess effort in the
first stage of our two-stage elimination tournament. By contrast, we do not observe
this phenomenon in a strategically equivalent one-stage tournament. Under a more
convex wage structure, the overprovision of effort is even more pronounced.
Our experiments suggest that behavior in multi-stage tournaments deviates from
behavior in one-stage tournaments in a systematic way. Our data do, however, not
allow us to give a definite answer on the precise mechanism that causes this change
in behavior. Several factors may act in concert: it could be that subjects experience
additional non-monetary “joy of winning” when being promoted (Parco et al. 2005),
which might be more pronounced when the hierarchy has more layers. An additional
potential rationale for subjects’ behavior are preferences for status (Moldovanu et al.
2007). Multi-stage tournaments with their more precise definition of hierarchical
9The same exercise for the TSC treatment yields a value of 14 while the average effort level
actually observed in the second stage of this treatment is 82.9. Thus, although subjects on average
choose efforts below the equilibrium value of 100 in the second stage of TSC, this cannot explain
the excess efforts exerted in the first stage.
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level (and status) might trigger especially competitive behavior of status concerned
agents. Our data on subjects’ expectations are consistent with these interpretations:
about two thirds of subjects choose an effort above the second-highest effort level
that they expect from their competitors, irrespective of the absolute level of the
effort expectation.
The observed behavior could also help to rationalize why firms rely so strongly
on promotions as incentive device, even in work environments where more direct
performance pay is feasible. Excess effort in early stages of multi-stage tournaments
makes this form of incentive provision comparatively “cheap” for the principal as
it decreases the wage cost per unit of effort. For instance, in our TS tournament
this cost is 9.81 Cent in theory, but only 8.36 Cent in practice. This implies that
a principal who implemented the TS wage scheme had to pay less for every unit of
effort (and production) than theoretically predicted. Which wage profile a principal
or tournament designer actually prefers depends on his objectives. In some situations
it might be sufficient to concentrate on the cost per effort. In other situations a
tournament designer may, for example, put special emphasis on the performance of
agents in higher stages of the tournament. The TSC treatment suggests that excess
effort in early stages eventually might come at the cost of reduced performance in
later stages if the wage structure becomes too convex. Independent of the specific
objective function, a tournament designer should take into account that agents’
behavior can ultimately change the optimal architecture of promotion tournaments
in terms of wage profiles, promotion rates, etc.
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Appendices
A.1 Instructions for Chapter 1
In this part of the experiment, your endowment, contributions, and earnings are
calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the points you have earned will
be converted at an exchange rate of 50 points = 1 Euro and paid out to you in
cash.
In this part of the experiment you are in a group together with one of the other
15 participants. This participant will be assigned to you randomly by the
computer. In each group of two there are two roles (a sender and a receiver). One
member of the group will be the sender, and one member of the group will be the
receiver. Each participant receives an endowment of 120 points.
The experiment consists of two stages:
In the first stage the sender can make a transfer to the receiver. The transfer is
a number between 0 and 120 in steps of 20 points, i.e., either 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100,
or 120 points. The transfer is tripled by the experimenter.
Examples: In case the sender transfers 60 points, the receiver gets 180 points.
In case the sender transfers 10 points, the receiver gets 30 points. In case nothing
is transferred, the receiver gets 0 points etc.
This means that, at the end of the first stage, the amount of points available to
the receiver is the sum of the endowment plus three times the transfer.
In the second stage the receiver can transfer any number of points back to the
sender. The amount sent back is not tripled. The back transfer must be a number
117
between 0 and 480. Once the receiver has decided on the back transfer the payoffs
are determined.
The payoff functions are thus as follows:
For the sender: 120 – transfer + back transfer
For the receiver: 120 + 3*transfer – back transfer
An example: Let’s assume the sender transfers 40 points. At the end of the first
stage the sender then has 120 – 40 = 80 points, and the receiver has 120 + 3*40 =
240 points. In the second stage, the receiver chooses a back transfer of 50 points.
The payoffs then are as follows: for the sender: 120 – 40 + 50 = 130 points. For
the receiver: 120 + 3*40 – 50 = 190 points.
At the end of this part of the experiment, the computer randomly determines if
you are a sender or a receiver. Because you do not know if you are a sender or a
receiver by now, you have to make a decision for both roles. Therefore you have to
make decisions on two separate computer screens: at first for the role of the receiver,
then for the role of the sender.
Please press CONTINUE to make your decision.
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B.2 Instructions for Chapter 2 (EWT)
Welcome to this decision-making experiment.
Please read the following instructions carefully. At the end of the instructions
you will find several control questions. After correctly answering these questions
the experiment will begin. The experiment will be conducted anonymously, that is
to say you will not learn with whom of the other participants you are interacting.
During the experiment you can earn taler. How much you earn depends on your
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. At the end of the experiment
these taler will be converted to Euro at an exchange rate of
1 Taler = 1 Cent
and be paid out to you. Please wait until you will be called to collect your
earnings. Please turn in all the documents you received to conduct the experiment
when you collect your earnings.
You will begin the experiment with an initial endowment of 400 talers (4 Euro).
This amount of talers will increase or decrease respectively with your earnings from
the different rounds. You can always rule out losses through your own decisions.
Please keep in mind that from now on and throughout the whole
experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other participants. In case
you do not respect this rule we are forced to terminate the experiment. If you have
any questions, please hold your hand out of the cubicle and we will come
to you.
As a participant in this experiment you either play the role of an employer or
an employee. Your specific role will be randomly determined at the beginning of
the experiment and it will be the same for all the following rounds.
The experiment will last for 12 rounds. At the beginning of each round, groups
of 3 participants will be formed, each consisting of one employer and two employees
(employee1 and employee2). In every new round new groups of three partic-
ipants will be randomly formed. Your decisions will only be disclosed to the
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other two participants in your current group. All the other participants will not be
informed about your decisions.
Each round consists of two stages. In the first stage employee1 and em-
ployee2 independently choose their amounts of work. There is a set of ten
different possible amounts of work out of which they can select their amount of
work. The smallest amount of work is 1 and the highest is 10. Every unit
of work creates 10 taler for the employer. For example: If the selected amout of
work is 1 then the employer receives 10 taler, if it is 2, he will receive 20 taler and so
on. If the selected amount of work is 10 the employer will receive 100 taler. For the
employee the selection of an amount of work is associated with costs. The higher
the selected amount of work, the higher the associated costs for the employee. The
employee’s costs only depend on his selected amount of work. The amount of work
selected by the other employees does not influence his costs. The costs regarding
the amount of work for the employee are the following:
Amount of work ei 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost c(ei) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20
So, the amount 1 of work is free for the employee. If the amount of work is 2, it
will cost the employee 1 taler and so on. If the amount of work is 10 the associated
cost is 20. All employees have the same cost table. The cost table will not change
during the 12 rounds.
In the second stage the employer will be informed about the amounts of work
selected by the employees in his group. Subsequently the employer will chose a
wage w, which he pays out to employee1 and employee2, that is he pays w taler
to employee1 and w taler to employee2. The wage per capita must not be smaller
than 0 taler and must not be greater than 100 taler.
While the employer chooses the wage-level w, each employee estimates the
amount of work the other employee in his group has selected. If his estima-
tion proofs correct he will receive 2 taler, if incorrect 0 taler. Other than that this
estimation has no further consequences. This estimation will not be disclosed
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to any of the other participants.
At the final stage of the round both employees and the employer will be informed
about the selected amounts of work, the payroll of each employee and the resulting
earnings of the employer.
The earnings in taler per round are thus calculated in the following way:
Earnings of the employer = 10 x amount of work of employee1 + 10 x amount
of work of employee2 - 2 x wage (w)
Earnings of employee 1 = wage (w) - cost of the amount of work of employee1
Earnings of employee 2 = wage (w) - cost of the amount of work of employee2
At the end of the experiment your total earnings, comprising the initial endowment,
the sum of your earnings in the different rounds and your earnings for correctly
estimating the amounts of work will be paid out to you. As mentioned above 1 taler
equals 1 Cent.
Please note that you are to write down all data of your group (amount of work,
wage w, earnings) on the result sheet at the end of each round.
121
C.3 Predictions for Fair-Minded Players
In this appendix, we analyze whether it can be profitable for firms to offer fair, rent-
sharing contracts in the IC treatment when we assume that a fraction of workers is
fair-minded. Our aim is not to fully characterize the set of feasible (Bayesian) Nash
Equilibria. Rather, we want to illustrate how fairness preferences shape the prof-
itability of certain contracting strategies and how this could influence labor market
outcomes. In particular, we aim at illustrating how contractual incompleteness can
render job rationing optimal for firms and, thus, can give rise to unemployment.
We first analyze the case where fair-minded workers insist on an equal distribu-
tion of surplus among all members of a firm. It is shown that under these prefer-
ences, it can be beneficial for firms to build up long-term work relationships and offer
strictly positive rents throughout the game. However, in this situation it is always
more profitable for firms to ration jobs and employ only one worker. We then analyze
the case where a fair-minded worker requires an equal share of the surplus generated
by himself. It is shown that—under this weaker fairness benchmark—firms always
prefer to employ the maximum number of workers.
C.3.1 Strictly Egalitarian Fairness Preferences
We assume that a fraction 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 of workers has “strictly egalitarian” fairness
preferences. Workers’ types are private information. A worker with such preferences
is assumed to fulfill the contract offered to him as long as the offered wage and desired
level of effort are such that the worker receives at least an equal share of the total
(net) surplus generated if all workers employed by the firm receive the same contract
offer and fulfill their contract. If the contract terms yield lower material payoffs to
the worker, the worker will accept the contract offer and shirk by providing the
minimum possible effort.10 The utility function of a worker with such preferences
10Since rejecting a contract offer yields a material payoff of zero and since the cost of providing
the minimum effort is also zero, we can assume without loss of generality that all contract offers
where w > 0 are accepted.
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can be summarized as follows:
u(w, e, eˆ) =
{
w − c(e) if w − c(eˆ) < 1
n+1
n[q(n)eˆ− c(eˆ)]
w − c(e)− bmax[eˆ− e; 0] if w − c(eˆ) ≥ 1
n+1
n[q(n)eˆ− c(eˆ)]
n denotes the number of workers employed by the worker’s firm, q(n) is the produc-
tivity of effort of a worker employed in a n-worker firm, eˆ and e are the contractually
desired and actually exerted levels of effort, c(eˆ) and c(e) are the effort cost of the
desired and exerted level of effort, and w is the wage stipulated in the contract. The
assumption regarding the fairness parameter b are as follows:
b > max{c′(e)}
This implies that a fair-minded worker maximizes utility by fulfilling the contract
(i.e., choosing e = eˆ) as long as he gets (at least) an equal share of the net surplus
that is created if all n workers of the firm fulfill their contract. In case the contract
offers him less than a fraction 1
n+1
of net surplus, the worker will always choose the
minimum possible level of effort.
In what follows, we will show that for these fairness preferences there can be
no equilibrium where (i) all firms employ two workers and (ii) efforts exceed the
minimum possible level. To do so, we first analyze under which conditions two-
worker firms would be willing to pay strictly positive rents to workers in the final
period of the game. Next we calculate firms’ and workers’ payoffs in pre-final periods,
analyzing the requirements to sustain cooperation in these periods. We then analyze
the case of one-worker firms. Finally, we show that for any fraction of p, firms are
better off if they employ only one worker.
Two-Worker Firms
Final Period
Firms are assumed to maximize (expected) monetary profits. In the final period,
T , a firm has to decide between offering payoff-equalizing contracts to workers (and
receiving above-minimal effort only from the fraction of fair workers) and the outside
option of offering an uncooperative contract where both types of workers shirk.
Since unemployment benefits for workers are equal to 0, workers will accept any
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contract that offers them at least a wage of 1. Therefore, the outside option of a
firm is to offer a wage of 1 and desire work effort of 1. This outside option ensures
the following last period profits ΠOT for firms:
ΠOT (w, eˆ) = Π
O
T (1, 1) = nq(n) ∗ 1− n1
It is easy to see that—with the parameters specified in Section 3.2.3—firms who
offer the uncooperative contract [1, 1] are always better of if they employ n = 2
workers. Since q(2) = 7, a firm hiring two workers at [w, eˆ] = [1, 1] earns ΠOT = 12
whereas a one-worker firm earns only ΠOT = 9 (since q(1) = 10).
Can a firm do better than this in period T by hiring two workers at a fair, i.e.,
payoff-equalizing wage? Since all fair workers fulfill such a contract in T and all
selfish workers shirk, the expected profits of a firm employing two workers at payoff
equalizing terms [w, eˆ] look as follows:
ΠT (w, eˆ) = p
22[q(2)e(w)−w]+(1−p)22(q(2)∗1−w)+p(1−p)2[q(2)e(w)+q(2)∗1−2w]
The first term specifies the firm’s profit if the firm happens to employ two fair-
minded workers (which occurs with probability p2), the second term specifies the
profits in case both workers are selfish (occurring with probability (1 − p)2), and
the final term summarizes the cases where one worker is fair-minded and fulfills the
contract and one worker is selfish (which occurs with probability p(1− p)2).
To make offering a strictly positive rent profitable for firms, it is necessary that
ΠT (w, eˆ) > Π
O
T = 12. From this, we can derive a threshold value p
∗ for the fraction of
fair workers above which it is profitable for firms to offer payoff equalizing contracts
in period T . Under our assumptions regarding the production function, effort cost,
and workers’ utility, this threshold value is p∗ ≈ 0.82. If p < p∗ no firm will offer
other contract terms than [w, eˆ] = [1, 1] in period T . If p ≥ p∗, two-worker firms will
offer the “fair” contract [w, eˆ] = [53, 10]. Any intermediate wage-effort combination
will never be offered by a two-worker firm in period T , i.e., it is not optimal to desire
1 < eˆ < 10 in period T at a payoff-equalizing wage.
Pre-Final Periods
Analyzing optimal contracts in pre-final periods is relatively straightforward. A fair
124
worker will cooperate in any period t as long as the contract offered is at least sharing
surplus equally. A selfish worker will cooperate and fulfill a contract in pre-final
periods if expected future rents give him higher payoffs than the immediate gains
from shirking. If p > p∗, firms will offer the fully cooperative contract [w, eˆ] = [53, 10]
in period T . If a firm re-employs its workers in period t+1 as long as they fulfill the
stipulated contract in period t and dismisses all workers who do not do so, a selfish
worker in period T − 1 has to decide between shirking in period T − 1 and being
unemployed in period T vs. adhering to the contract in T −1 and being re-employed
in period T . The first option yields a payoff of piT−1+piT = wT−1−c(1)+0, the latter
option yields piT−1 + piT = wT−1 − c(eˆT−1) + 53 since a re-employed selfish worker
receives wT = 53 in period T and shirks (i.e., eT = 1). As c(eˆT−1) < 53, selfish
workers who are offered [w, eˆ] = [53, 10] in period T − 1 will fulfill their contract.
Therefore it is optimal for two-worker firms to offer [w, eˆ] = [53, 10] in all pre-
final periods t < T if p > p∗. Under this contract, both types of workers fulfill
their contracts in t < T and earn pit = 53 − c(10) = 35 and firms earn Πt =
2 ∗ q(2) ∗ 10− 2 ∗ 53 = 34. In the final period, fair workers fulfill and earn piT = 35,
selfish workers shirk and earn piT = 53, and firms earn ΠT = p
2 ∗ (34) + (1 − p)2 ∗
(−84) + p(1− p) ∗ 2 ∗ (−27) > ΠOT .
One-Worker Firms
Final Period
Can it be profitable for a firm to employ only one worker in period T and offer him
a strictly positive rent? To analyze this question, remember that a firm’s outside
option is hiring two workers at the minimum possible wage of 1. If a firm instead
hires one worker at a payoff equalizing wage level, its expected final-period profits
are given by
ΠT (w, eˆ) = p[q(1)e(w)− w] + (1− p)[q(1) ∗ 1− w]
We can again calculate a threshold share of fair workers, p∗∗, above which it is
profitable for a firm to offer a fair, cooperative contract to one worker in the final
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period. Evaluating ΠT and Π
O
T for our parameter constellation yields the threshold
p∗∗ ≈ 0.68. Above p∗∗, a firm employing one worker and offering the payoff-sharing
contract [w, eˆ] = [59, 10] receives higher expected profits than ΠOT . Again, it is
not profitable for firms to offer fair contracts at intermediate desired effort levels
1 < eˆ < 10.
Pre-Final Periods
Turning to pre-final periods and applying the results for two-worker firms, coop-
eration by selfish and fair-minded workers can be sustained in every period t < T
if p > p∗∗. If this is the case, a firm can offer the fully cooperative rent-sharing
contract [w, eˆ] = [59, 10] to one worker in every period and apply a strategy of con-
tingent contract renewal, i.e., re-employing its worker if he adhered to the contract
in the period before and dismissing the worker if e 6= eˆ in the previous period. Fair
workers adhere to this contract in every period since it offers them a fair share of
the surplus. Selfish workers imitate fair workers in all pre-final periods since the
prospect of being re-employed and earning future rents gives them an incentive to
do so in all but the final period. In the final period, selfish workers provide minimum
effort and earn piT = w = 59.
Comparing One-Worker Firms and Two-Worker Firms
Comparing the results for the one-worker and two-worker case, it is immediately
obvious that there can be no Bayesian Nash Equilibrium with above-minimal co-
operation and full employment (i.e., all firms employ two workers). The threshold
share of fair workers necessary for inducing cooperation in the final period (and
consequently in all pre-final periods) is higher for the two-worker firm than for a
one-worker firm, i.e., p∗ > p∗∗. If the actual level of fair minded workers is between
the two thresholds, cooperation can only be achieved if just one worker is employed
by the firm.
Moreover, even if there are sufficiently many fair-minded workers to make coop-
eration in two-worker firms feasible (i.e., if p ≥ p∗), firms are better of if they employ
only one worker. The fair contract which induces maximum effort in the two-worker
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firm is [w, eˆ] = [53, 10]. This contract yields firm profits of Πt = 34 in all periods
t < T and ΠT (n = 2) ≥ ΠOT in T . By contrast, the fair and fully efficient contract
in a one-worker firm is [w, eˆ] = [59, 10]. This contract generates strictly higher firm
profits in every period: Πt = 41 in t < T and ΠT (n = 1) ≥ ΠT (n = 2) for all values
of p.
There are several reasons for why cooperation is harder to achieve in two-worker
firms. First, two-worker firms face a higher probability of meeting at least one selfish
worker who definitely shirks in final period: 1 − p2 > 1 − p. Moreover, surplus to
be distributed is not twice as high as in one-worker firms due to decreasing returns
to scale (q′(n) < 0). Both effects increase the threshold level of fair-minded workers
necessary to induce cooperation in the final period for two-worker firms. The latter
effect in addition decreases profits of two-worker firms in every period compared to
the profits of a one-worker firm. For our assumptions on the production function,
receiving 33% of the higher total (net) surplus generated in a two-worker firm is
less profitable than receiving 50% of the (smaller) surplus produced in a one-worker
firm.
C.3.2 Relation-Specific Egalitarian Fairness Preferences
How do outcomes change if workers’ fairness preferences are not characterized by the
strict egalitarianism stipulated above? In what follows, we stick to the assumption
that a fraction p of workers is fair-minded. However, we now assume that a fair-
minded worker considers a contract offer fair if it splits the surplus generated by
himself equally between him and the firm. The fair-minded worker’s utility function
is therefore given by:
u(w, e, eˆ) =
{
w − c(e) if w − c(eˆ) < q(n)eˆ− c(eˆ)
w − c(e)− bmax[eˆ− e; 0] if w − c(eˆ) ≥ q(n)eˆ− c(eˆ)
If the firm employs only one worker, this notion of fairness is equivalent to the one
assumed above. However, firms employing two workers can now extract up to 50%
of the net surplus generated by workers’ efforts, compared to only 33% in the strictly
egalitarian case. If other words, a fair-minded worker neglects his firm’s payoff from
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relations with other workers, and considers only the distribution of payoffs in his
own work relationship.
As a consequence, the threshold fraction of fair-minded workers necessary to
give two-worker firms an incentive to offer positive rents in the final period of the
game decreases. Following the steps of the calculation above, it now pays off for
firms to employ two workers in the final period and offer them fair contract terms
as soon as p > p∗∗∗ ≈ 0.68. At this critical value, a two-worker firm’s best strategy
in the final period is to offer the fair contract [w, eˆ] = [34, 8]. In pre-final periods,
the optimal strategy for a two-worker firm is to offer the fully cooperative contract
[w, eˆ] = [44, 10].
Since the “relation-specific” fairness benchmark implies that fair-minded workers
in one-worker firms still require 50% of net surplus, the critical value for profitably
employing one worker and the optimal contracts for one-worker firms remain un-
changed from the previous analysis. Importantly, this implies that under the weaker
fairness benchmark it is always better for firms to employ two workers for our ex-
perimental parameters. If p < p∗∗∗, both types of firms can only implement minimal
effort in all periods. Since the second worker is productive, a firm prefers employing
two workers at the same effort level for the minimal wage w = 1. If p > p∗∗∗, a firm
employing one worker receives 50% of q(1) ∗ e− c(e), whereas a firm employing two
workers receives 50% of 2 ∗ [q(2) ∗ e− c(e)]. In every pre-final period, the maximum
effort e = 10 will be provided in both types of firms. This means that a two-worker
firm’s payoff is equal to 50% of the first-best surplus, whereas a one-worker firms
payoff is equal to the same share of the lower surplus that can be achieved with one
worker. Similarly, in the final period of the game, payoffs for a two-worker firm are
strictly higher than the one for a one-worker firm for every level of p > p∗∗∗.
128
C.4 Instructions for Chapter 3 (IC Treatment)
In what follows, we present a translation of the instructions for buyers (i.e., em-
ployers) in the IC treatment. The instructions for workers in this treatment had a
similar structure. The instructions of participants in the C treatment differed only
in the description of the second stage (i.e., the work phase).
Instructions for Buyers
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Everything that you need to know to participate in this
experiment is explained below. Should you have any difficulties in understanding
these instructions please raise your hand. We will answer your questions at your
cubicle.
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial endowment of 8
Euros. Over the course of the experiment you can increase your income by earning
points. The amount of points that you earn during the experiment depends on
your decisions and the decisions of other participants.
All points that you earn over the course of the experiment will be exchanged
into Euros at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be:
1 Point = 4 Cents
At the end of the experiment, the amount of money that you earned
during the experiment as well as your 8 Euros initial endowment will be
paid out in cash.
The experiment is divided into several periods. In each period you have to make
decisions which you will enter in a computer. In total, there will be 18 periods.
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited dur-
ing the experiment. In addition we would like to point out that you may only use
the computer functions which are required for the experiment. Violation of these
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rules will lead to exclusion from the experiment. In case you have any questions we
shall be glad to assist you.
Prior to the experiment the 24 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers
and sellers. In this experiment there are 7 buyers and 17 sellers.
You will be a buyer for the entire duration of the experiment. All
participants have received an identification number which they will keep for the
entire experiment. Your identification number is stated on the documentation sheet
in front of you.
Short Overview of the Experimental Procedures
In each period of the experiment every buyer can trade a product with no, one or
two sellers. The seller earns a profit through the trade when he sells the product at
a price which exceeds his production costs. The buyer earns a profit through the
trade when the price he pays for the product is less than what the product is worth
to him. The production costs of the traded product as well as the buyer’s valuation
of the product depends on the quality of the product. In addition the value of the
product for the buyer depends on the number of products bought. Two products of
a certain quality are worth more to the buyer, but not worth twice as much as one
product of the same quality.
The experiment lasts 18 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows:
Each period commences with a trading phase which lasts 200 seconds. During
this phase buyers can submit trade offers which can be accepted by sellers. When
submitting an offer a buyer has to specify three things:
• Which price he offers to pay
• which product quality he desires
• and finally, which sellers he wants to submit the offer to. Buyers can sub-
mit two types of offers: private offers and public offers. Private offers are
submitted to one specific seller and can only be accepted by that seller.
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Public offers are submitted to all sellers and can be accepted by any
seller.
As a buyer you can submit as many offers as you like in each period. Once
submitted, offers can be accepted constantly. Each seller can only enter one
trade agreement in each period. Each buyer can at most enter two trade
agreements. As there are 7 buyers and 17 sellers, some sellers will not trade in
each period.
After the trading phase, every sellers who accepted a trade agreement has to
determine which quality of product he will provide to his buyer. Hereby, the
seller is not obliged to provide the product quality desired by the buyer.
Once every seller has chosen which product quality to provide, earnings of all
participants for the given period are determined. Subsequently, the next period
commences. The earnings from all 18 periods will be summed up at the end of the
experiment, exchanged into Euros and paid out in cash together with your initial
endowment.
The Experimental Procedures in Detail
There are 7 buyers and 17 sellers in the experiment. You are a buyer for the entire
duration of the experiment. During the experiment you will enter your decisions in
a computer. In the following we describe in detail how you can make your decisions
in each period.
1. The Trading Phase
Each period commences with a trading phase. During the trading phase the buyers
can enter into trading agreements with the sellers. In order to do so, each buyer
can submit as many trade offers as he wishes. In each trading phase you will
see the following screen.
In the top left corner of the screen you will see the current period of the experi-
ment. In the top right corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in this
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trading phase, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in each period lasts
200 seconds. When this time is up the trading phase is over. Hereafter, no further
offers can be submitted or accepted for this period.
Once you see the above screen displayed the trading phase commences. As a
buyer you now have the opportunity to submit trade offers to the sellers. In order
to do so you have to enter three things on the right hand side of the screen:
(A) First, you have to specify whether you want to submit a public or private offer:
Public trade offers
Public offers will be communicated to all participants in the market. All sellers see
all public offers on their screens. A public offer can therefore be accepted by any
seller. As a buyer you will also see all public offers submitted by all buyers. If you
want to submit a public offer, please mark the field “public” using the mouse.
Private trade offers
Private offers are submitted to one seller only. Only this seller will be informed
about this offer and only this seller can accept the trade offer. No other seller or
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buyer will be informed about that offer. If you want to submit a private offer,
please mark the field “private” using the mouse. In the field below, you then have
to specify which seller you want to submit the offer to. Each of the 17 sellers
has an identification number (Seller1, Seller2, ..., Seller17). Each seller keeps his
identification number for the entire duration of the experiment. To submit an offer
to a specific seller you enter the number of that seller (e.g. “4” for Seller4).
(B) Once you have specified who you want to submit an offer to, you must determine
which price you offer. You enter the offered price into the field “your price”. The
price you offer must not be below 0 or above 100:
0 ≤ Price offered ≤ 100
(C) Finally, you have to specify which product quality you desire. You enter this in
the field “desired quality”. Your desired quality cannot be lower than 1 or higher
than 10.
1 ≤ Desired quality ≤ 10
After you have completely specified your trade offer, you have to click the “ok”
button to submit it. As long as you have not clicked “ok” you can still change your
trade offer. After you click “ok” the offer will be displayed to all sellers you have
submitted it to.
On the left side of your screen you see the heading “public offers”. All public
offers in the current trading phase will be displayed here—your public offers as well
as the public of all other buyers. You can see which buyer submitted the offer, which
price he offered and which quality he desired. All buyers also have an identification
number which they keep throughout the experiment (Buyer1, Buyer2, ..., Buyer7).
In the middle of your screen, under the header “your private offers” you will see
all private offers which you have submitted in the current trading phase. Here you
can see which seller you submitted an offer to, which price you offered and which
quality you desired.
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As long as none of your offers has been accepted by a seller, you as a
buyer can submit as many private and public offers as you wish in each
period. Each offer that you submit can be accepted at any time during the trading
phase.
As soon as one of your offers has been accepted you are informed which seller
accepted which of your offers. In the bottom left corner of your screen the iden-
tification number of the seller who accepted the offer will be displayed as well as
your offered price and desired quality. At the same time all your other offers will be
automatically canceled.
You can then decide if you want to enter another trade agreement. Each buyer
can enter no, one or two trade agreements in each period. If you want to
enter another trade agreement you can submit further offers to the sellers. As long
as none of your offers has been accepted by a seller you can offer as many private
and public offers for the second trade as you wish.
If you do not want to enter another trade agreement you can press the button
“finish trading phase”. This reduces the length of the trading phase if other buyer
wants to submit further offers. By pressing the button, the offers you have already
submitted will be automatically canceled and you can not submit any further offers.
Trade agreements which were already accepted by a seller of course persist. In
addition you will continue to see the screen of the trading phase until it is definitely
over.
No seller can enter more than one trade agreement in each period.
You will be constantly informed which sellers have not yet entered a trade agreement.
In the table with the title “The following sellers have already entered a trading
agreement” you can see 17 fields. Once a seller has accepted an offer a “+” will
appear in the field next to his identification number. You cannot submit private
offers to a seller who has already accepted an offer.
The trading phase is over after 200 seconds have elapsed, or once all buyers
have entered two trade agreements, or if the remaining buyers have signalized that
they do not want to enter trade agreements anymore by pressing the button “finish
134
trading phase”.
No buyer is obliged to submit trade offers, and no seller is obliged to accept a
trade offer.
2. Determination of actual product quality
Following the trading phase, all sellers who have entered a trade agreement deter-
mine which product quality they will supply to their respective buyer. First, the
sellers see again the price and the desired quality on a new screen. If you have
entered two trade agreements in one period your sellers can also see the price and
the desired quality of your other seller. The sellers then decide independently which
actual product quality to choose for their product. The product quality which
you desired in your trade offer is not binding for your seller(s). Your seller
can choose exactly the quality you desired, but he can also choose a higher or lower
product quality. The product quality which your seller chooses has to be an integer
between 1 and 10:
1 ≤ Actual product quality ≤ 10
While the sellers determine the actual product quality, we ask you on a separate
screen to specify which quality(ies) you expect him (them) to supply. In addition
we ask you to state how sure you are about this expectation.
How are incomes calculated?
Your income:
If you do not enter a trade agreement during a trading phase you earn an
income of 0 points in this period.
If you have entered one trade agreement, your income depends on which price you
offered and which product quality your seller supplied to you. Your income will
equal 10 times the actual product quality minus the price you pay. Your income
will thus be determined as follows:
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Your income = 10*Actual product quality - Price
If you have entered two trade agreements, your income depends on which prices
you offered to both sellers and which product qualities were supplied to you by the
sellers. The value of the products in total can be higher for you if you enter two
trade agreements but the value of a single product is lower.
In other words, two products of a certain quality are worth more to you, but not
worth twice as much as one product with the same quality. If you buy one product
you earn 10 times the chosen product quality. If you buy two products you earn 7
times the quality of the first product and 7 times the quality of the other product.
Of course, when you buy two products you also have to pay two prices. Your income
if you enter two trade agreements thus is determined as follows:
Your income = 7*Actual product quality product 1 + 7*Actual product
quality product 2 - Price 1 - Price 2
An example: If you enter one trade agreement and the actual product quality is
8, your income is 80 minus the price. If you enter two trade agreements and both
actual product qualities are 8 your income is 112 (=7*8+7*8) minus both prices.
However, if—for instance—one actual product quality is 8 and the other quality is
1, your income is 63 (= 7*8 + 7*1) minus both prices.
As you can see from the above formula your income is higher, the higher the
product quality actually supplied to you by the seller(s). At the same time your
income is higher, the lower the price(s) you have to pay for the product(s).
Income of your seller:
If a seller has not entered a trade agreement during a trading phase he earns an
income of 0 points in this period.
If a seller has accepted a trade offer his income will equal the price he receives minus
the production costs he incurs for the product supplied. The income of your seller
is determined as follows:
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Income of your seller = Price - production cost
The production costs of a seller are higher, the higher the quality of the product he
chooses. The production costs for each product quality are displayed in the table
below:
Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Production costs 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
The income of your seller is higher, the higher the price which he is paid. Further,
his income is higher, the lower the product quality he supplies to you.
The incomes of all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way. Each
buyer can therefore calculate the income of his seller(s) and each seller can
calculate the income of his buyer. Further, each buyer and seller is informed
of the identification number of his trading partner in a given period.
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses
have to be paid from your initial endowment of money or from earnings in other
periods.
You will be informed about your income and the income of your seller on a sepa-
rate “income screen”. On the screen the following information will be displayed:
• Which seller(s) you traded with
• Which price(s) you paid
• Your desired quality(ies)
• The actual product quality(ies) supplied by your seller(s)
• The income of your seller(s) in this period
• Your income in this period.
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Please enter all the information into the documentation sheet supplied to you.
After the income screen has been displayed, the respective period is concluded.
Thereafter the trading phase of the following period commences. Once you have
finished studying the income screen pleas click on the “OK” button.
The sellers also view an income screen which displays the above information.
They see the ID of their buyer, the price, desired and actual product quality as well
as their own income, your income and—if you have entered two trade agreements—
the income of your other seller.
The experiment will not commence until all participants are completely familiar
with all procedures. In order to make sure that this is the case we kindly ask you
to solve the exercises below.
In addition we will conduct a trial of the trading phase, so that you can get
accustomed to the computer. This trial phase will not be added to the result of the
experiment and therefore not remunerated. Following the trial phase we will begin
the experiment which will last for 18 periods.
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D.5 Instructions for Chapter 4 (TS Treatment)
Brief overview
Now today’s main experiment starts. You already know that your former decisions
do not affect your chances at this experiment. Please read the following information
carefully. At the end of the information you will find some sample questions. After
all participants have answered the questions correctly, this part of today’s session
will start.
At the beginning of the experiment groups consisting of 4 participants will
be assigned randomly. Your income in this experiment will depend on your
own decisions and the decisions of the other three members of your groups. The
experiment will remain anonymous, which means that you will not know at any time
who the other group members are.
The experiment consists of one round divided into two stages. At each stage
the participating group members choose a decision number independently from
each other.
The choice of the decision number is associated with certain costs. The sum of
your decision number and a number chosen randomly by the computer will determine
your result. The result of the first stage will determine whether you participate in
the second stage: In the first stage all four group members participate; in
the second stage only the two group members with the highest results
participate.
Your income will be calculated in the following way: The group member with
the highest result in the second stage will receive the amount of 20.00 Euro and
has to pay the costs of his two decision numbers. The participant with the lower
result in the second stage will receive the amount of 12.11 Euro minus the costs
of his two decision numbers. The two participants who did not participate in the
second stage will receive the amount of 5.73 Euro each minus the cost of their
decision number in the first stage.
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At the end of the second stage, each participant will be informed about his
resulting income. After this notification the experiment is over. Your income will
be paid to you in cash at the end of the session.
Detailed Information
During this experiment you are in a group together with three other par-
ticipants, so each group consists of four persons. You will not know at any time
who the other members of your group are. The experiment consists of exactly one
round divided into two stages. Take your time to think about your decision(s).
Stage 1
In the first stage all participants choose a decision number independently from
each other. This number can be between 0 and 125.
When choosing your decision number you will produce some costs, which you can
see in the enclosed cost table. In general, it can be said that the higher the decision
number, the higher the cost. The attached table contains all eligible decision
numbers and the respective costs. For example, a decision number ”0” causes
costs of 0 Euro, a decision number of 50 causes costs of 1.11 Euro, etc.
Your result depends on the chosen decision number. Additionally, your result
depends on a random number. This random number is a number between -60
and 60 randomly chosen by the computer. Each number between -60 and 60 has the
same probability to be selected. The computer will choose the random number for
each participant individually and independently, which means that the random
numbers of the individual participants can be different from each other.
Your decision number (chosen by yourself) and the random number (chosen by
the computer) will determine your result for the first stage:
Your result (stage 1) = your decision number + your random number
Your result is higher when your decision number is higher. That means that
the probability to reach the second stage increases with a higher decision
number.
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Additionally, your result increases with the random number. For example, if you
choose a decision number of 30 and the computer chooses a random number of 15,
your result is 45. If you choose a decision number of 93 and the random number is
-34, your result is 59.
At the end of the first stage, all participants will be notified about their random
number and their result. The result of the first stage determines whether or not you
participate in the second stage. Only the participants with the two highest results
in your group will participate in the second stage. If two group members have the
same result, the participant in the second stage will be drawn by lot. The two group
members with the lowest results in the first stage will not participate in the second
stage. They receive 5.73 Euro minus the cost of their decision number.
Stage 2
The process in stage 2 resembles the process in stage 1. The two group members
who participate in the second stage again get to choose a decision number, which
is associated with the costs found in the cost table. Additionally, the computer
chooses a new random number for each of the two participants individually.
As in stage 1, your result is determined according to the following formula:
Your result (stage 2) = your decision number + your random number
Your result in the first stage thus has no influence on your result in the second
stage. At the end of the second stage, you will see your decision number and your
random number, and you will know if you got the lower or the higher result in this
stage. The participant with the lower result in stage 2 receives 12.11 Euro minus
the cost of his decision numbers (in both stages). The participant with the higher
result receives 20.00 Euro minus the cost of his decision numbers (in both stages).
At the end of the second stage, each participant will be informed about their in-
come determined by their decisions and the random numbers. After this notification
the experiment is over.
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How is your income calculated?
Your income in this experiment depends on your result and the results of the
other group members in stage 1. If you have one of the two highest results in your
group, your income additionally depends on your result and the result of the other
participant in stage 2.
Three cases can be distinguished:
Case 1: You do not have one of the two highest results in stage 1. In this case you
do not participate in stage 2 and your income is calculated in the following way:
Income = 5.73 Euro - cost of your decision number in stage 1
Case 2: You achieved one of the two highest results in stage 1 and the lower result
in stage 2. In this case your income is calculated in the following way:
Income = 12.11 Euro - cost of your decision number in stage 1 - cost of
your decision number in stage 1
Case 3: You achieved one of the two highest results in stage 1 and the higher result
in stage 2. In this case your income is calculated in the following way:
Income = 20.00 Euro - cost of your decision number in stage 1- cost of
your decision number in stage 2
In sum, your income is higher, the higher the designated amount of
money you are entitled to and the lower your costs. Please note that in
cases 2 and 3 your costs incurred in stages 1 and 2 are relevant for the calculation
of your income.
If you have any further questions, please raise your hand and we will come over
to answer them.
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D.6 Schedule of Effort Costs
Cost Table
Decision Number Cost in Euro Decision Number Cost in Euro
0 0.000 63 1.76
1 0.000 64 1.82
2 0.002 65 1.88
3 0.00 66 1.94
4 0.01 67 2.00
5 0.01 68 2.06
6 0.02 69 2.12
7 0.02 70 2.18
8 0.03 71 2.24
9 0.04 72 2.30
10 0.04 73 2.37
11 0.05 74 2.43
12 0.06 75 2.50
13 0.08 76 2.57
14 0.09 77 2.64
15 0.10 78 2.70
16 0.11 79 2.77
17 0.13 80 2.84
18 0.14 81 2.92
19 0.16 82 2.99
20 0.18 83 3.06
21 0.20 84 3.14
22 0.22 85 3.21
23 0.24 86 3.29
24 0.26 87 3.36
25 0.28 88 3.44
26 0.30 89 3.52
27 0.32 90 3.60
28 0.35 91 3.68
29 0.37 92 3.76
30 0.40 93 3.84
31 0.43 94 3.93
32 0.46 95 4.01
33 0.48 96 4.10
34 0.51 97 4.18
35 0.54 98 4.27
36 0.58 99 4.36
37 0.61 100 4.44
38 0.64 101 4.53
39 0.68 102 4.62
40 0.71 103 4.72
41 0.75 104 4.81
42 0.78 105 4.90
43 0.82 106 4.99
44 0.86 107 5.09
45 0.90 108 5.18
46 0.94 109 5.28
47 0.98 110 5.38
48 1.02 111 5.48
49 1.07 112 5.58
50 1.11 113 5.68
51 1.16 114 5.78
52 1.20 115 5.88
53 1.25 116 5.98
54 1.30 117 6.08
55 1.34 118 6.19
56 1.39 119 6.29
57 1.44 120 6.40
58 1.50 121 6.51
59 1.55 122 6.62
60 1.60 123 6.72
61 1.65 124 6.83
62 1.71 125 6.94
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D.7 Elicitation of Risk Attitudes
In the following, we describe the lottery procedure that was used to elicit partici-
pants’ risk attitudes for the analysis in Chapter 4. The same procedure (with slightly
different payoffs) was also used in the experiment of Chapter 1.
Instructions
Before the start of today’s main experiment, this first part of the experiment deals
with individual decision making. This means that your income in this part only
depends on your personal decisions and the outcomes of lottery drawings.
This part of the experiment deals with choices between a lottery and a safe
payment. In the following, you are presented 15 situations. In each situation the
lottery is the same, but the safe payment varies. In the lottery you receive 4 Euro
with a probability of 50% and 0 Euro with a probability of 50%.
On the following screen you can see the 15 situations. Please decide for each
situation if you want to choose the lottery or the safe payment.
At the end of the experiment one of the 15 situations is randomly chosen by
the computer. According to your decision in this situation you then either take part
in the lottery or you receive the respective safe payment. If you have chosen the
lottery in this situation, the outcome of the lottery will also be randomly determined
by the computer at the end of the experiment. Your income will be paid to you in
cash at the end of the experiment.
Please press CONTINUE to make your decisions.
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Lottery Choices
Please decide for every situation whether you choose the lottery or the safe payment!
Situation Lottery Safe Payment Your Decision
Lottery Safe Payment
1 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 0.25 Euro
2 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 0.50 Euro
3 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 0.75 Euro
4 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 1.00 Euro
5 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 1.25 Euro
6 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 1.50 Euro
7 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 1.75 Euro
8 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 2.00 Euro
9 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 2.25 Euro
10 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 2.50 Euro
11 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 2.75 Euro
12 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 3.00 Euro
13 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 3.25 Euro
14 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 3.50 Euro
15 50% Chance 4 Euro and 50% Chance 0 Euro 3.75 Euro
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